CONTINGENT DESIGN & THE COURT REFORM DEBATE

G. Michael Parsons*
Once unimaginable, the prospect of Supreme Court reform seems increasingly real. Republican
presidents have appointed fifteen of the last twenty Justices despite losing the popular vote in
seven of the last eight elections, and these figures can no longer be chalked up to the timing of
vacancies alone. After blocking President Obama’s nominee for Justice Scalia’s seat for almost a
year to purportedly give “the American people a voice in selecting their next Supreme Court
Justice,” Senate Republicans filled Justice Ginsburg’s seat with President Trump’s nominee mere
weeks before the 2020 election. With Democrats now in control, the debate has turned to what
new policies might replace the old, defunct norms.
According to conventional wisdom, this debate revolves around one task: identifying the reform
plan that best threads a needle between political reality and legal rigor. This is because Congress
will presumably get “one shot” before the benefits of time and inertia shift to the Court itself. The
consequences of this framing are profound: reformers water down popular policies to protect
against invalidation, court-packing dominates the debate based on its constitutional credentials,
and the chance to achieve real change quickly starts to slip away.
This Article challenges the premise Congress must take such a passive approach to judicial review,
expressing policy preferences in seriatim fashion (and being “sent back to the drawing board”
each time a policy fails). This approach merely reflects institutional habits. And by failing to
question these habits, reformers forfeit an enormous amount of legislative power.
Congress can reclaim this power by strategically structuring judicial review using two methods.
First, Congress can constitutionally safeguard its reform agenda by layering its policy preferences
from most politically desirable to most legally defensible using “fallback” (or “backup”) law. If the
Court holds the first preference unconstitutional, the second will automatically take its place—and
so on. Thus, the Court shoulders the inertial cost of its own unpredictability. While it retains the
power to evaluate each layer’s lawfulness, it cannot wage a war of attrition against Congress.
Second, Congress can politically safeguard its power by designing appellate procedures that
consolidate and prioritize all challenges to the law. By giving the same coalition that enacted the
law a chance to respond to the Court’s decision, this approach insures against the tail risk of total
invalidation and prevents the Court from “running out the clock” against Congress.
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By identifying how existing court-reform proposals price in the inertia- and time-related risks of
a passive approach and by proactively neutralizing those risks, this more strategic frame opens up
new reform possibilities. It also offers two warnings. First, because the time available to Congress
is a source of institutional power, Congress should begin its work straightaway and enact a reform
package as early as possible in the current session. Second, Congress should avoid pursuing a
single “best” policy given that this could perversely shrink the space for agreement. Instead,
Congress should layer its reform proposals in whatever way produces the strongest coalition and
the most durable plan.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION........................................................................................ 797
I. PASSIVE FRAMING: THE SELF-IMPOSED LIMITS OF THE TRADITIONAL
COURT REFORM DEBATES ....................................................................... 804

A. The Impact on Option Design ......................................................... 806
B. The Impact on Option Comparison ................................................ 811
II. ACTIVE FRAMING: SETTING THE TERMS OF INTERBRANCH DIALOGUE
813

A. Constitutional Safeguarding: Inertia v. Layered Design ................... 813
B. Political Safeguarding: Time v. Custom Appellate Procedures ....... 816
III. A LAYERED PROPOSAL FOR SUPREME COURT REFORM ................... 819

A. Regularizing Appointments & Restoring Jurisdiction........................ 820
1. Layer One ................................................................................... 820
2. Layer Two ................................................................................... 820
3. Layer Three................................................................................. 821
B. Policy Benefits & Objections ............................................................ 822
1. Regularizing Appointments ......................................................... 822
2. Restoring Jurisdiction .................................................................. 834
C. Layering Objections ......................................................................... 842
1. Legislative Duty ........................................................................... 842
2. Nondelegation ............................................................................. 843
3. Judicial Coercion ......................................................................... 844
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................ 850

August 2021]

CONTINGENT COURT REFORM

797

INTRODUCTION
Once a third rail in American politics, the prospect of Supreme Court
reform is now mainstream—and it’s easy to see why. The traditions and
conventions we typically associate with judicial independence are historically
contingent,1 and the past few years have seen a surge in norm-breaking by
Republicans2 to an extent that has made Democratic complacency
unacceptable, including to longtime skeptics of court reform.3
Calls for court packing, for example, have quickly gone from unthinkably
radical to part of an “everything is on the table” posture embraced by

1

2

3

Tara Leigh Grove, The Origins (and Fragility) of Judicial Independence, 71 VAND. L. REV. 465, 517
(2018) [hereinafter Grove, Judicial Independence] (arguing that “the current conventions of judicial
independence depend in part on narratives crafted by our political and legal culture”).
Examples include routine filibustering to block judicial nominees (in the minority); ending “blue
slips,” where Senators can informally veto home-state nominees; foregoing ABA review of nominees;
refusing to hold hearings on President Obama’s nominee to fill Justice Scalia’s seat, and confirming
President Trump nominees after his loss. See E.J. Dionne Jr. et al., How the GOP Prompted the
Decay
of
Political
Norms,
THE
ATLANTIC
(Sept.
19,
2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/09/gop-decay-of-political norms/540165/ (The
Republican party has seen a “deterioration in the standards of political behavior” take root); Dahlia
Lithwick & Tobias Barrington Wolff, Mitch McConnell Is Cranking Out Lame-Duck Judges, SLATE
(Dec. 17, 2020, 6:43 PM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2020/12/mitch-mcconnell-lame-duckjudges.html (Republican Senator Mitch McConnell “push[ed] through yet more judges even after his
party has lost the presidency in a national election”). Such moves are sometimes referred to in the
literature as “constitutional hardball.” See Mark Tushnet, Constitutional Hardball, 37 J. MARSHALL
L. REV. 523, 523 (2004) (“[I]t consists of political claims and practices—legislative and executive
initiatives—that are without much question within the bounds of existing constitutional doctrine and
practice but that are nonetheless in tension with existing pre-constitutional understandings.”).
To be sure, Democratic responses contributed to this decay in norms (such as Senate Majority
Leader Harry Reid’s disposal of the filibuster for all lower court appointments), and accusations of
“unprecedented” behavior admittedly represent “creative act[s] of interpretation” that reflect political
judgments. See generally Josh Chafetz, Unprecedented? Judicial Confirmation Battles and the
Search for a Usable Past, 131 HARV. L. REV. 96 (2017). Nonetheless, there is a growing consensus
that Republicans have more readily embraced these hardball tactics over the last few decades. Joseph
Fishkin & David E. Pozen, Asymmetric Constitutional Hardball, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 915, 920–26
(2018).
Various 2020 Democratic presidential candidates showed interest in altering the Court despite the
topic having “until recently remain[ed] on the fringes of the debate.” Burgess Everett & Marianne
Levine, 2020 Dems Warm to Expanding Supreme Court, POLITICO (Mar. 18, 2019, 5:04 AM),
https://www.politico.com/story/2019/03/18/2020-democrats-supreme-court-1223625
(including
Senators Elizabeth Warren and Kirsten Gillibrand). See also Quinta Jurecic & Susan Hennessey,
The Reckless Race to Confirm Amy Coney Barrett Justifies Court Packing, THE ATLANTIC (Oct. 4,
2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/10/skeptic-case-court-packing/616607/ (the
most common suggestion has been to add two seats to the Court).
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Democratic leadership.4 Even Joe Biden—a practiced centrist initially reluctant
to wade into the debate on the campaign trail5—eventually pledged to create a
commission to study what reforms might be available to fix a system that had
grown “out of whack.”6
With Biden’s election and Democratic control of Congress,7 the debate
has now shifted from a question of “whether” to questions about “what” and
“when.” Will President Biden’s commission help create consensus or just
waste precious time?8 Can Democrats construct a political coalition in 2021 or
does the thin margin of control in the Senate doom meaningful reform?9
4

5

6

7

8

9

See Jeff Shesol, The Case Against Packing the Court, NEW REPUBLIC (Oct. 14, 2020),
https://newrepublic.com/article/159691/case-against-packing-supreme-court
(quoting
Senate
Minority Leader Chuck Schumer that “[n]othing is off the table” if Republicans appoint Barrett to
fill Ginsburg’s seat before the 2020 election); see also Andrew K. Jennings & Athul K. Acharya, The
Supreme Court and the 177th Congress, 11 CALIF. L. REV. ONLINE 407, 408–09 (2020)
(“[P]rominent members of Congress, including Representative Jerry Nadler (the chair of the House
Judiciary Committee, which has jurisdiction over federal courts), have suggested that expanding the
Court would be an appropriate response to a pre-election or lame-duck confirmation.”); Ryan D.
Doerfler & Samuel Moyn, Democratizing the Supreme Court, 109 CALIF. L. REV. 2, 3 n.1
(forthcoming 2021) (quoting Ian Millhiser, Vox’s Supreme Court reporter, for the point that courtpacking would have seemed “extraordinarily radical” only “two years ago”).
See generally EVAN OSNOS, JOE BIDEN: THE LIFE, THE RUN, AND WHAT MATTERS NOW (2020)
(examining Joe Biden’s quest for the presidency and how history placed him at “pivotal moments of
modern history”).
Sam Gringlas, Asked About Court Packing, Biden Says He Will Convene Commission to Study
Reforms, NPR (Oct. 22, 2020, 9:46 AM), https://www.npr.org/2020/10/22/926607920/asked-aboutcourt-packing-biden-says-he-will-convene-commission-to-study-reforms.
Given that Vice President Kamala Harris is not a member of the Senate, the Senate is technically a
“tied Senate” despite Democrats having effective majority control given Harris’s tie-breaking role.
See Louis Jacobson, How Will the Senate Work Under a 50-50 Split?, POLITIFACT (Jan. 7, 2021),
https://www.politifact.com/article/2021/jan/07/how-will-senate-work-under-50-50-tie/ (“[T]here is no
written roadmap that Senate leaders must follow.”).
See Niels Lesniewski, Biden’s Court Commission Draws Ire of Court-packing Critics and
Supporters, ROLL CALL (Oct. 22, 2020, 11:24 AM), https://www.rollcall.com/2020/10/22/bidenscourt-commission-draws-ire-of-court-packing-critics-and-supporters/ (describing President Biden’s
desire to create a commission).
Democratic Senator Joe Manchin, who “[i]n a deadlocked Senate . . . could be the deciding vote on
a wide range of issues,” opposes packing the Court. Salena Zito, Joe Manchin Digs In: ‘Under No
Circumstances’ Would Break Tie to Nuke Filibuster and Pack Court, WASHINGTON EXAMINER
(Nov. 11, 2020, 6:58 AM), https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/joe-manchin-digs-inunder-no-circumstances-would-break-tie-to-nuke-filibuster-and-pack-court. See also Matt Ford, The
Supreme Court Is in Charge Now, THE NEW REPUBLIC (Nov. 13, 2020),
https://newrepublic.com/article/160178/supreme-court-biden-judicial-gridlock (“Even if [Democrats
win the Georgia runoffs], court reform is effectively dead for the foreseeable future. Democrats would
have had an uphill battle to pack the Supreme Court even with a substantial majority in the House
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Should reformers seek changes to the Court’s personnel or to its underlying
power?10 And which option (among the several available in each category)
should Congress ultimately pursue, given the political and legal risks and
benefits of each?11
While these questions are vital, I argue in this Article that they are being
artificially constrained and distorted by an unnecessary set of assumptions—an
implicit framing of the debate in which Congress imagines itself to be a passive
actor. This framing assumes (1) that Congress can only express singular
preferences about court design in seriatim fashion (with Congress “sent back
to the drawing board” to enact new legislation if the Court finds the first policy
unconstitutional), and (2) that the Court will review legislation under the
procedures (and at the pace) of typical litigation. These two assumptions
silently cede an enormous amount of institutional power—the power of inertia
and time—from Congress to the Court. And taken together or separately, they
reflect a surprising self-abnegation, forfeiting key sources of legislative leverage.
In this Article, I challenge this passive account and explain how Congress
can proactively set the terms of the debate to meet the Court on more level
ground. Congress could do so in two ways: (1) using contingent provisions
(otherwise known as “fallback” or “backup” law) to layer its design preferences
from most politically desirable to most constitutionally defensible, and (2)
designing specific appellate procedures to consolidate and prioritize
challenges so that the same political coalition that enacted the court-reform
package has a chance to respond to the Court’s decisions about that law.
By identifying how commentators have strategically (and unnecessarily)
discounted policy options based on their relative inertia- and time-related
risks, this proactive framing of the debate opens up a range of new political
and legal options by greatly expanding the bargaining zone available to
potential political coalition members.

10

11

and a few extra seats in the Senate; the current margins will make it impossible even if they secure
control of the Senate.”).
See Doerfler & Moyn, supra note 4, at 1–2 (“Progressives are taking Supreme Court reform seriously
for the first time in almost a century.”); Jennings & Acharya, supra note 4, at 407-10 (discussing the
117th Congress’s legislative options to “expand the court, limit its certiorari discretion, restrict its
jurisdiction, or reroute its jurisdiction” and concluding that any of these responses is possible).
See infra text accompanying notes 42–52 (listing current set of statutory reform proposals). Like
Professors Doerfler and Moyn, this Article focuses on statutory reforms options given the likely
infeasibility of constitutional reform. See Doerfler & Moyn, supra note 4, at 4, n.3.
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But first, how did we get here? The last meaningful discussion of Supreme
Court reform occurred in the 1930s and long stood as “a cautionary tale more
than an inspiring precedent.”12 Conservative and progressive scholars alike
floated ideas to rein in judicial power over the years, but outside the academy
the general shape and structure of the Court has remained unchallenged since
President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s failed court-packing attempt.13
Yet as Professor Tara Leigh Grove observes in her recent article charting
our conventions about judicial independence, “[w]hat we currently view as
utterly ‘out of bounds’” is highly contingent on historical developments and
prevailing social and political forces.14 There is nothing inevitable about the
particular “shared norms” that developed since the 1930s, and nothing to keep
them norm-like when they cease being shared.
Our current period of rapid norm-transformation is perhaps best
explained (and bookended) by two statements by then-Senate Majority Leader
Mitch McConnell.15 Following the unexpected death of Justice Antonin Scalia,
the first statement came on February 13, 2016 when McConnell vowed to
block any nominee put forward by President Barack Obama to fill Scalia’s

12

13
14

15

Doerfler & Moyn, supra note 4, at 4. See also Richard H. Pildes, Is the Supreme Court a
“Majoritarian” Institution?, 2010 SUP. CT. REV. 103, 132 (2010) (describing the conventional wisdom
that “FDR lost the battle, but won the war, since the Court . . . acceded to the New Deal’s
constitutionality,” but observing that “FDR’s legislative assault on the Court destroyed his political
coalition, in Congress and nationally . . . . The progressive domestic policy agenda did not recover
until 1964”).
Doerfler & Moyn, supra note 4, at 9–11.
Grove, Judicial Independence, supra note 1, at 545. Cf. Jack M. Balkin, From Off the Wall to On
the Wall: How the Mandate Challenge Went Mainstream, THE ATLANTIC (June 4, 2012),
https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2012/06/from-off-the-wall-to-on-the-wall-how-themandate-challenge-went-mainstream/258040/ (“Three years ago, the idea that the [Affordable Care
Act’s] mandate to purchase health insurance might be unconstitutional was, in the view of most legal
professionals and academics, simply crazy. . . . Yet in three years’ time, the argument . . . has moved
from crazy to plausible . . . .”).
There are, to be sure, deeper and longer trends at play as well. Professors Doerfler and Moyn posit
the 2008 financial crisis led to the rise of a “political and academic left” with a more ambitious agenda
and a more discerning appreciation for the structural bulwarks blocking progressive change beyond
the edge of center-left liberalism. See Doerfler & Moyn, supra note 4, at 10. This trend followed an
even longer forty-year campaign within conservative circles to make deeper inroads in legal academia
and the courts. Maria Liasson & Barbara Sprunt, As Supreme Court Nears Solid Conservative
Majority, GOP Reaps Reward From “Long Game”, NPR (Aug. 4, 2018, 7:00 AM),
https://www.npr.org/2018/08/04/632865899/as-supreme-court-nears-solid-conservative-majoritygop-reaps-reward-from-long-ga. Even so, the willingness of establishment liberals to contemplate
reform seems triggered by more recent events.
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seat.16 While the partisan politics of this obstruction were obvious, the position
at least came accompanied by a neutral patina to provide public cover: “The
American people should have a voice in the selection of their next Supreme
Court Justice. Therefore, this vacancy should not be filled until we have a new
president.”17
Over the next four years, however, McConnell’s judicial campaign was
never far from the headlines as it became increasingly aggressive. Following
through on his vow, McConnell blocked President Obama’s moderate
nominee, Judge Merrick Garland, for 293 days,18 and confirmed conservative
Justice Neil Gorsuch to the seat shortly after the election of President Donald
Trump.19
Then the Court’s median “swing” vote, Justice Anthony Kennedy, decided
to retire after hand-picking and personally suggesting his own successor:
former Kennedy clerk and conservative judge, Brett Kavanaugh. Kavanaugh
ascended to the seat following a confirmation battle in which he was credibly
accused of sexual assault and offered shockingly partisan and vindictive
testimony, calling the allegations against him “a calculated and orchestrated
political hit” and “revenge on behalf of the Clintons.”20
Finally, following the death of liberal stalwart Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg,
Senate Republicans scrambled to fill her seat in less than a month with yetanother reliable conservative: Justice Amy Coney Barrett. This sudden rush
in the waning days of the 2020 presidential campaign21 put final lie to the
Republican claim that they had blocked Garland’s nomination almost five

16

Burgess Everett & Glenn Thrush, McConnell Throws Down the Gauntlet: No Scalia Replacement
Under Obama, POLITICO (Feb. 13, 2016, 9:56 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2016/02/mitchmcconnell-antonin-scalia-supreme-court-nomination-219248.

17
18

Id.

19
20
21

Jess Bravin, President Obama’s Supreme Court Nomination of Merrick Garland Expires, WALL ST.
J. (Jan. 3, 2017, 5:23 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/president-obamas-supreme-courtnomination-of-merrick-garland-expires-1483463952.
Nina Totenberg, Senate Confirms Gorsuch to Supreme Court, NPR (Apr. 7, 2017, 2:47 PM),
https://www.npr.org/2017/04/07/522902281/senate-confirms-gorsuch-to-supreme-court.
Daniel Epps & Ganesh Sitaraman, How to Save the Supreme Court, 129 YALE L. J. 148, 158-59
(2019).
Sahil Kapur et al., Senate Confirms Amy Coney Barrett, Heralding New Conservative Era for
Supreme Court, NBC (Oct. 27, 2020, 6:47 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/congress/amyconey-barrett-set-be-confirmed-supreme-court-monday-n1244748.
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years prior based on “[a] long-standing tradition of not fulfilling a nomination
in the middle of a presidential year.”22
While Republicans’ disparate treatment of Garland and Barrett
demonstrated that the norms governing appointments were no longer shared,
McConnell’s closing statement following the confirmation of Justice Barrett
removed all doubt: “A lot of what we’ve done over the last four years will be
undone sooner or later by the next election . . . [but Democrats] won’t be able
to do much about this for a long time to come.”23
To be sure, nominations are (and long have been) a political affair, with
partisan coalitions trying to lock in judges and Justices favorable to their
agendas.24 But the current confluence of judicial polarization,25 judicial
supremacy,26 and judicial detachment from popular sentiment27 has reached a
new extreme. Today, five out of the six conservatives on the Court were
appointed by Republican Presidents who lost the popular vote,28 and the most
recent three of those Justices were confirmed by Senators representing a

22

23

24
25

26

27
28

Russell Wheeler, McConnell’s Fabricated History to Justify a 2020 Supreme Court Vote,
BROOKINGS INST. (Sept. 24, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2020/09/24/mcconnellsfabricated-history-to-justify-a-2020-supreme-court-vote/ (quoting McConnell).
‘They Won’t Be Able to Do Anything About This’: McConnell Revels in Barrett Supreme Court
Vote,
THE
GUARDIAN
(Oct.
25,
2020,
3:43
PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/law/2020/oct/25/mitch-mcconnell-amy-coney-barrett-supreme-courtrepublicans-democrats-mike-pence-covid.
See, e.g., JACK M. BALKIN, THE CYCLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL TIME 77-80 (2020) (discussing
“partisan entrenchment” in the federal judiciary).
NEAL DEVINS & LAWRENCE BAUM, THE COMPANY THEY KEEP: HOW PARTISAN DIVISIONS
CAME TO THE SUPREME COURT 2 (2019) (observing that the Justices reflect the “polarization that
has had its greatest effects in elite segments of American society”); Epps & Sitaraman, supra note 20,
at 155–56 (“[T]he Supreme Court is perfectly polarized on party lines as well—for the first time, all
Democrat-appointed Justices are reliably liberal and all Republican-appointed Justices are reliably
conservative.”).
See BALKIN, supra note 24 at 69, 81–84 (observing that the partisan definitions of what counts as
“judicial activism” or “judicial restraint” change with the cycle of political regimes, but that the Court’s
power as a whole tends to grow through these cycles regardless).
See infra notes 28-29.
See Ronald Brownstein, Fight over Ginsburg Succession Poses Stark Question: Can Majority Rule
Survive in US?, CNN (Sept. 20, 2020), https://edition.cnn.com/2020/09/20/politics/ruth-baderginsburg-supreme-court-successor/index.html (noting that in addition to the three justices nominated
by President Trump, who lost the popular vote, two of the six “currently serving Republicanappointed justices were nominated by President George W. Bush, who also initially lost the popular
vote. The final one, Clarence Thomas, was approved by senators who also represented less than half
of Americans.”).
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minority of the American people as well.29 This new “minoritarian majority”
of Justices exercises more power than ever before, and they exercise it in more
reliably partisan ways than ever before.30
In short, “[f]or the first time in living memory, the [C]ourt will be seen by
the public as a party-dominated institution, one whose votes on controversial
issues are essentially determined by the party affiliation of [their appointing]
presidents.”31 And while the concept of judicial independence contemplates
judges who can decide discrete cases free from the vicissitudes of public
opinion once in office,32 it is incompatible with an appointment process that
creates a durable partisan power center. Indeed, the most historically
significant attempts to capture the courts in this way predate our modern
conventions and resulted—predictably—in backlashes to restore whatever
relative balance had been disrupted.33
And so our current moment unfolds in predictable fashion. Overreach is
met with correction. The violation of past norms unsettles expectations until
new conventions create a new equilibrium. The current debates over courtreform design reflect this search: How will the new system promote stability?
Fairness? Legitimacy?34
These are important questions, no doubt. But so too is how we get there.
This “new system” will not spontaneously arise: any changes must earn the
support of a broad coalition, traverse both chambers of Congress, and then
face the courts themselves. The power, policy, and politics of the result

29

30
31
32
33

34

Michael Tomasky, The Supreme Court’s Legitimacy Crisis, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/05/opinion/supreme-courts-legitimacy-crisis.html (written about
the last two appointments before Barrett).
See generally DEVINS & BAUM, supra note 25.
Lee Epstein & Eric Posner, If the Supreme Court Is Nakedly Political, Can It Be Just?, N.Y. TIMES
(July 9, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/09/opinion/supreme-court-nominee-trump.html.
See infra notes 112, 149–153 (noting that the core of judicial independence is “decisional
independence” and discussing the institutional safeguards created to allow such independence).
See Grove, Judicial Independence, supra note 1, at 507-08 (highlighting partisan efforts to modify
the composition of the Court in advance of the Jefferson and Johnson administrations); Joshua
Braver, Court-Packing: An American Tradition?, 61 B.C. L. REV. 2747, 2751 (2020) (distinguishing
the legitimacy assigned to modifications to the Court’s size arising from circuit-riding from those that
were primarily catalyzed by partisan motivations).
See, e.g., Epps & Sitaraman, supra note 20, at 152 (noting that any proposal “needs to be stable going
forward” in order to create “a fair equilibrium” and also evaluating proposals based on fairness). But
cf. Doerfler & Moyn, supra note 4, at 12-13 (critiquing definitions of “fair-dealing” that rely on
assumptions of judicial non-partisanship or neutrality and aim to re-legitimate judicial power).

804

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 23:4

depend on the power, policy, and politics of the transition. The terms of that
transition are our focus here.
Part I identifies how the court reform debates to date have implicitly
adopted a view of Congress that renders it a passive observer in the transition
process. By unconsciously operating within this frame, legislators unilaterally
relinquish otherwise-powerful sources of political consensus and institutional
leverage. The passive framing also shapes and prelimits the options available
to court reformers and warps comparisons between those options in ways that
are avoidable once the assumptions underpinning the passive framing are let
go.
Part II explains how Congress can assert itself more strategically and
proactively in the interbranch dialogue over court reform by enacting legal and
political safeguards to govern the terms of the transition process and the
accompanying interbranch dialogue. These include layering multiple
contingent reforms via a set of “fallback” or “backup” provisions (to ensure
overall constitutionality and to offset the risks associated with institutional
inertia) as well as designing appellate procedures and prioritization
requirements (to prevent the Judiciary from “waiting out” the political coalition
that enacted the initial measure).
While none of the methods set out in Part II are entirely novel, they have
not been a part of the court reform debate and can play a particularly powerful
and unique role in this context. Indeed, that these approaches are
uncontroversial is an important source of their legal and political power. The
active account reveals that the high stakes and high risks currently associated
with various standalone reform proposals are largely a byproduct of
institutional advantages that are imputed to the Court rather than inherent.
Part III then offers an example of how a contingent approach to court
reform might look, explores some benefits of the particular layers proposed,
and anticipates potential objections to its layered design.
I.

PASSIVE FRAMING: THE SELF-IMPOSED LIMITS OF THE TRADITIONAL
COURT REFORM DEBATES

Over the past year, commentators, elected officials, and political
candidates have contributed to a surge in debate over various court reform
proposals and their merits. To some extent, this discussion incorporates the
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challenges of transition, with commentators designing and weighing options
based on the political and legal risks posed by each option.35
Yet, at a deeper level, all of these discussions reflect a set of shared
assumptions about how Congress must structure legislation and how the Court
will review it. I call this set of assumptions the “passive frame,” and its
fundamental premise is simple: the task facing Congress is to identify a singular
reform plan that represents the best possible combination of political reality,
constitutional defensibility, and institutional sufficiency.
Why is the debate framed in this way? Because commentators presume
Congress will only have “one shot” to get its proposal right at the time of
enactment.36 Once Congress enacts its plan, the institutional benefits of time
and inertia will shift to the Court—the institution that will ultimately decide the
plan’s fate.37 The consequences of this framing on the debate are profound.
If Congress overshoots its mark and enacts a plan that the Court finds
unconstitutional, Congress will have spent a vast amount of political capital for
nothing. Not only might Congress lack the ability to gear back up and enact a
new plan (given shifting electoral pressures and competing political priorities),
but the slow pace of litigation also means that the political coalition that
enacted the plan may no longer exist due to intervening elections. “Congress,”
after all, changes every two years. The Court does not.
If Congress undershoots the mark, however, the cost of adequately
anticipating the Court’s predilections may simply be inefficacy: a weak plan
that fails to adequately set a new norm (or, perhaps, a plan so tepid that no
coalition finds it worth enacting in the first place).

35

36
37

See, e.g., Epps & Sitaraman, supra note 20, at 172–204 (discussing and offering various proposals for
Court reform); see also Doerfler & Moyn, supra note 4, at 25-71 (analyzing the multitude of
justifications for Court reform from both “personnel” and “disempowering” perspectives). But see
Epps & Sitaraman, supra note 20, at 171 (suggesting a potential backup option in the form of a
“threat” that might cause the Court to “blink before striking down a reform measure as
unconstitutional,” such as adding “five new Justices” or removing the Court’s jurisdiction). For the
reasons set out in Part III.C.3., such an approach might be more vulnerable to constitutional
challenge in its own right.
See supra Parts I.A. & I.B.
I say this as a practical and predictive manner, not as a prescriptive manner. I also bracket questions
of justiciability in this piece, including standing and the political question doctrine. Court reformers
of all stripes assume that a Court determined to find a “hook” for review will be able to do so. That
makes evaluating the merits of plans a necessary endeavor, even if solely for strategic and political
insurance.
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This conundrum reveals how heavily the institutional advantages of inertia
and time influence Congress’s calculus. Commentators believe the Court has
inherent leverage in any fight over its future form. First, the Court can wage a
war of attrition, rejecting proposals seriatim until Congress simply relents.
Second, the Court can “run out the clock,” managing its docket to slow down
review of the legislation and “wait out” the political coalition that enacted the
initial reform.
Yet these supposed institutional advantages are not inevitable. Instead,
they result from various players (judicial, legislative, academic) settling into
patterns associated with, but not demanded by, judicial supremacy. Identifying
these trappings of judicial supremacy helps us to prevent imputing more power
to the Court than it deserves or has traditionally claimed. For even if one
believes (rightly or wrongly)38 that the Supreme Court does or should have
interpretive supremacy over the substantive meaning of the Constitution, one
need not subscribe to any broader view of institutional supremacy or power.
Congress still retains a robust set of powers to structure the terms of its
interbranch dialogue with the Court—powers that have been left on the table
to date. By overlooking the effect of these powers on the larger court reform
debate, scholars and elected officials are unintentionally prelimiting their
universe of potential design options and unnecessarily constricting their ability
to form the broadest possible political coalition.
In the rest of Part I below, I provide some examples of how the passive
view of Congress not only shapes the design of individual court reforms but
also impacts the comparison between those design options, including which
designs seem worth pursuing at all.

A. The Impact on Option Design
As Professors Ryan Doerfler and Samuel Moyn observe in a recent article,
court reform proposals generally fall into one of two categories: changes to the
Court’s personnel or changes to the Court’s power.39

38

39

For discussions of popular constitutionalism and departmentalism, see generally MARK TUSHNET,
TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999); LARRY D. KRAMER, THE
PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004); Dawn E.
Johnsen, Functional Departmentalism and Nonjudicial Interpretation: Who Determines
Constitutional Meaning?, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 105 (2004).
Doerfler & Moyn, supra note 4, at 17-18. See also Jennings & Acharya, supra note 4, at 410
(identifying two court reform options that affect personnel and two that affect jurisdiction).
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Personnel reforms “propose to alter the Supreme Court’s partisan or
ideological composition”40 to help protect the Court’s legitimacy (“that is, the
degree to which it is perceived as legitimate by the American people”).41
Examples of personnel proposals include court-packing,42 panel systems,43
senior-status requirements after a term of years (e.g., 18 years),44 or more
innovative designs, such as the “Balanced Bench”45 or “Lottery”46 systems
proposed by Professors Daniel Epps and Ganesh Sitaraman. For the most
part, personnel reforms take for granted the powerful role that the Court plays
in American society today—they just aim to make the exercise of that power
“fairer” (whether by moderating the Court’s politics or by regularizing
appointments so that the Court’s politics are never durably minoritarian).47
Disempowering reforms, on the other hand, are about “institutional
redefinition” rather than “institutional relegitimation.”48 Rather than focus on
who sits on the Court, they focus on what the Court can do.49 Examples of
disempowering proposals include jurisdiction-stripping,50 supermajority voting

40
41
42
43
44

Doerfler & Moyn, supra note 4, at 17.
Epps & Sitaraman, supra note 20, at 150–51.
See e.g., Doerfler & Moyn, supra note 4, at 19 (describing the “pack the courts” movement); Epps &
Sitaraman, supra note 20, at 175–77 (discussing what court-packing is and entails).
See e.g., Doerfler & Moyn, supra note 4, at 19–20; Epps & Sitaraman, supra note 20, at 175
(describing potential Supreme Court panel systems).
Epps & Sitaraman, supra note 20, at 173–75. Many “term limit”-style plans originated as proposals
for constitutional amendments. See Henry Paul Monaghan, The Confirmation Process: Law or
Politics?, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1202, 1211–12 (1988) (recommending lawmakers consider both an age
limit and a term limit of fifteen to twenty years for Supreme Court Justices); Philip D. Oliver,

Systematic Justice: A Proposed Constitutional Amendment to Establish Fixed, Staggered Terms for
Members of the United States Supreme Court, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 799 (1986) (outlining the benefits

45
46
47
48
49
50

of a Supreme Court whose members are limited to eighteen-year terms); James E. DiTullio & John
B. Schochet, Note, Saving This Honorable Court: A Proposal to Replace Life Tenure on the
Supreme Court with Staggered, Nonrenewable Eighteen‐Year Terms, 90 VA. L. REV. 1093 (2004)
(proposing the adoption of a constitutional amendment that would limit Supreme Court service to a
fixed eighteen-year term).
Epps & Sitaraman, supra note 20, at 193–205.
Id. at 181–92.
Doerfler & Moyn, supra note 4, at 17–25 (distinguishing between “moderating” reforms and
“democratizing” reforms).
Id. at 8.
Id. at 18.
Id. at 23–24; Epps & Sitaraman, supra note 20, at 177–79.
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rules for judicial review,51 and congressional review procedures.52 These
approaches “limit the Supreme Court’s ability to make policy to varying
degrees” and “effectively reassign power away from the judiciary and to the
political branches.”53
For this Article, however, the specific details of each plan and the different
values each promotes are less important than one feature they all share: they
are each envisioned and evaluated as “standalone” options. Each proposal is
designed on the assumption that there is unlikely to be much political appetite
for going “multiple rounds” with the Court and so any political and legal risks
must be addressed from the outset.
Consider one of the most popular personnel reforms: requiring Justices to
take “senior status” after eighteen years so that a new Justice can be appointed
every two years.54 This approach would regularize the appointment process,
give every president two appointments, and ensure that the “active” members
of the Court never reflect any durable partisan affiliation. Although this
proposal is often colloquially said to create “term limits” for the Justices, the
moniker is not quite right: Justices would retain a lifetime appointment,
continue to decide cases by sitting on the circuit courts, and could “fill in” any

51

52
53
54

See generally Evan H. Caminker, Thayerian Deference to Congress and Supreme Court
Supermajority Rule: Lessons from the Past, 78 IND. L. J. 73 (2003) (describing how Congress could
instate supermajority rules to fix the pattern of the Supreme Court invalidating federal legislation by
a bare majority); Doerfler & Moyn, supra note 4, at 24 (claiming that a supermajority rule “would
effectively implement a Thayerian ‘clear error’ standard for judicial review” (citing James B. Thayer,
The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129
(1893))); Epps & Sitaraman, supra note 20, at 190–92 (describing arguments for and against
supermajority voting rules); Jed Handelsman Shugerman, A Six-Three Rule: Reviving Consensus
and Deference on the Supreme Court, 37 GA. L. REV. 893 (2003) (detailing how using a
supermajority rule could resolve decreased consensus and deference to Congress on the Supreme
Court); Jeremy Waldron, Five to Four: Why Do Bare Majorities Rule on Courts?, 123 YALE L.J.
1692 (2014) (discussing majority decision and arguments against it). But see Caminker, supra, at 94–
101 (identifying some difficulties with justifying supermajority rules on the logic of operationalizing
Thayerian deference, but arguing that this “misses the fundamental point” that supermajority rules
“can serve as an independent mechanism for tempering the aggressiveness of judicial review . . . .”);
Guha Krishnamurthi, For Judicial Majoritarianism, 22 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1201 (2020) (providing a
defense of majority voting on appellate courts over supermajority or unanimity rules).
Doerfler & Moyn, supra note 4, at 24–25.
Id. at 18.
See id. at 21–22.
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vacant Supreme Court seats that might open prematurely due to an active
Justice’s retirement or death.55
This proposal has enjoyed strong bipartisan support over the years, has no
obvious or durable political valence over time, and—in our current moment—
seems uniquely suited to creating a new, stable norm.56 But is it constitutional?
With credible arguments both in favor57 and against58 its constitutionality, the
odds of such a plan being upheld are highly uncertain. And while scholars may
be comfortable opining about the plausibility of the plan’s constitutionality,59
legislators are unlikely to find similar comfort in such lukewarm assurances.
This fear of invalidation has prompted proponents to preempt concerns
by including a “grandfather” clause. This clause suspends the operation of the
senior-status requirement for sitting Justices and limits its application to future
appointments.60 From a legal perspective, the clause is thought to strengthen
the constitutionality of the Act “by eliminating a retroactive application of the
Act’s redefinition of the ‘office’ of a Supreme Court Justice.”61 And from a
55
56
57

58

59

60

61

See generally Term Limits, FIX THE COURT, https://fixthecourt.com/fix/term-limits/ (last updated
Sept. 29, 2020) (providing an overview of the key distinctions between retirement and senior status).
See infra Part III.B.1.i. for a discussion of the benefits of implementing an eighteen-year senior-status
requirement as the “Layer One” reform.
See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington & Roger C. Cramton, The Supreme Court Renewal Act: A Return to
Basic
Principles,
PAULCARRINGTON.COM
(July
5,
2005),
http://paulcarrington.com/Supreme%20Court%20Renewal%20Act.htm (proposing that Congress
enact a law imposing term limits and related measures in order to prevent the negative consequences
of lifetime tenure); see also, e.g., Roger C. Cramton, Reforming the Supreme Court, 95 CAL. L. REV.
1313, 1323–34 (2007) (advocating for implementation of Supreme Court term limits by statute or
constitutional amendment).
See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & James Lindgren, Term Limits for the Supreme Court: Life Tenure
Reconsidered, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 769, 855–68 (2006) (discussing arguments in opposition
to reforms related to lifetime tenure).
See, e.g., Doerfler & Moyn, supra note 4, at 51; see also Epps & Sitaraman, supra note 20, at 152
(highlighting the precise proposals conducted by scholars, Daniel Epps and Ganesh Sitaraman). If
the Court observed a Thayerian account of judicial review, “plausibility” might roughly track
constitutionality, see note 51, but that is not how the Court currently understands its role and not how
reformers and scholars approach the question today.
See, e.g., Supreme Court Term Limits and Regular Appointments Act of 2020, H.R. 8424, 116th
Cong. § 2 (2020) (stating that no Justice appointed before the date of enactment of this Act shall be
required to retire pursuant to the Act’s subsection (a)); see Carrington & Cramton, supra note
55(proposing a rotational system wherein all Justices appointed to the Court in the future would serve
as the nine deliberating and deciding members for a period of eighteen years); see also Vicki C.
Jackson, Packages of Judicial Independence: The Selection and Tenure of Article III Judges, 95
GEO. L.J. 965, 1001 (2007) (mentioning two proposed schemes for eighteen-year term limits for
Supreme Court Justices that apply only prospectively to new appointees).
Carrington & Cramton, supra note 55.
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political perspective, it might increase the odds that the law is upheld because
it “buys out” the Justices who will likely rule on the constitutionality of the
measure itself.
Here we can see how a passive framing of the issue warps the proposal.
Even if one believes a grandfather clause is not legally necessary, advocates
and legislators are compelled to include it to give the plan its “best shot” at
survival. This calculation takes the Supreme Court’s supposed institutional
advantages of inertia and time into account when building the proposal.
But the very inclusion of the clause changes the stakes of the plan and the
potential coalitions that might support it. A plan implemented in dribs and
drabs over the next forty years presents a very different proposition than a plan
that would see the four most senior Justices (Thomas, Breyer, Roberts, and
Alito) take senior status over the next eight years.62
The influence of the passive frame also silently guides the shape of popular
disempowering reforms like jurisdiction-stripping. The general concept
behind jurisdiction-stripping is simple: Congress removes the jurisdiction of
the courts to hear certain kind of cases, effectively leaving those disputes to
political rather than judicial resolution.63
But this purported simplicity is deceiving. “[T]he constitutionality of
jurisdiction-stripping proposals remains one of the most significant
unanswered questions in the field of federal courts,”64 and the questions
“become more difficult the more comprehensive the strip.”65 Given these
concerns, Congress has generally declined to enact the vast majority of

62

63

64

65

See Doerfler & Moyn, supra note 4, at 61 (calling one set of term limits proposals “feasible because
trivial” and stating passage would make little difference). At the time of writing, Justice Breyer has not
yet announced his retirement.
See Doerfler & Moyn, supra note 4, at 23 (noting that “[b]y removing the judiciary from the process,
jurisdiction-stripping legislation would tie policy outcomes exclusively to the most recent
congressional and presidential legislation”).
Epps & Sitaraman, supra note 20, at 178 (citing Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Jurisdiction-Stripping
Reconsidered, 96 VA. L. REV. 1043, 1045 (2010), and Brian T. Fitzpatrick, The Constitutionality of
Federal Jurisdiction-Stripping Legislation and the History of State Judicial Selection and Tenure, 98
VA. L. REV. 839, 839–40 (2012)) (emphasizing that “[T]here is one [question] in particular that
puzzled scholars unlike any other: whether Congress can withhold all federal jurisdiction…in a case
raising a federal constitutional claim); see also Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit
the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1364–65 (1953)
(fearing “destr[uction of] the essential role of the Supreme Court in the constitutional plan”).
Doerfler & Moyn, supra note 4, at 54.
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jurisdiction-stripping statutes that have been introduced over the years,66 and
the Court has studiously avoided directly ruling on the constitutionality of
those statutes that have managed to survive the legislative process.67 This
uneasy truce has persisted for generations, and an explicit jurisdiction-stripping
bill would push Congress into clear confrontation with the Court.
Of course, the whole point of jurisdiction-stripping legislation is to directly
limit the Court’s reach and explicitly reserve questions for political resolution.
But, here too, congressional fears about the potential judicial response
preemptively shape the specific scope of the proposal. The risk is that the
Court might get the final word, with Congress shying away from future forays
if it receives a strong rebuke.
Jurisdiction-stripping proposals thus reflect the same balance between
minimizing risk and undermining the efficacy of the reform. A strip that is
sweeping—whether in court coverage or substance matter coverage68—would be
more efficacious but riskier. A more limited strip might assuage constitutional
concerns69 but simply not be worth the effort.
In short, the instinct to “preempt constitutional concerns” by wateringdown or qualifying the proposal at hand often has less to do with the
proponent’s independent interpretive judgment about constitutional meaning
and more to do with a belief that the Court holds a strategic institutional upper
hand.

B. The Impact on Option Comparison
This strategizing over the likelihood of survival also informs the
comparison between options.
First, it focuses undue attention on the comparison between court-packing
and, well, everything else. Because court-packing is a plainly constitutional
66

67

68
69

See Tara Leigh Grove, The Structural Safeguards of Federal Jurisdiction, 124 HARV. L. REV. 869,
880–887 (2011) [hereinafter Grove, Structural Safeguards] (describing the long history of jurisdictionstripping efforts).
Fallon, supra note 64, at 1045 (“[O]n the infrequent occasions when Congress has enacted laws that
appear to attempt comprehensive jurisdiction withdrawals, the Supreme Court, more often than not,
has strained to read them as effecting less than total preclusions . . . to avoid the serious constitutional
questions that otherwise would arise.”).
Doerfler & Moyn, supra note 4, at 22–23 (discussing calls for sweeping strips such as prohibiting
courts from reviewing federal legislation or constitutionality at all).
To be fair, a targeted strip might raise different constitutional concerns that a more general strip does
not.
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option, it receives attention disproportionate to its other risks and benefits.
Does abandoning the convention of nine Justices risk a popular backlash and
a quick loss in the political capital necessary to pursue other legislation?70 Sure.
Does court-packing risk retaliation and escalation?71 Sure. Does “reciprocal
hardball can play into the hands of authoritarians by alienating moderates,
unifying autocratic forces, and even providing a pretext for government
repression?”72 Sure. But is it certain to survive the judicial gauntlet? You bet.73
And for many reformers, that is (understandably) priority number one.
Second, the danger of judicial invalidation pushes some of the most
intriguing contenders out of the debate given the relative degree of uncertainty
they prompt. Even someone who supports ideas like the “lottery,” broad
jurisdiction-stripping, or congressional review in theory may be
understandably skeptical to do so in fact, given the stakes. Simply put, a oncein-a-century moment does not seem like a great time to test out a creative idea
or explore the limits of one of the biggest debates in federal courts.
Third, the assumptions implicit in the passive account distort the
comparison between personnel versus disempowering approaches more
generally. While these two categories might be squared off to determine which
is worth pursuing,74 this either/or framing rests on an assumption that the
enactment of one is likely to come at the expense of the other given the
political capital it will take to enact any reform. But the issues presented by
personnel and disempowering reforms are related.75 Personnel changes might
be unlikely to have the kind of deep, structural impact of disempowering

70

71
72

73

74
75

Pildes, supra note 12, at 132 (“Reflecting back, FDR’s second vice president, Henry Wallace,
observed: ‘The whole New Deal really went up in smoke as a result of the Supreme Court fight.’ No
rational politician, looking back at FDR’s attempt to bring the Court into line, other than through the
ordinary appointments process, is likely to repeat FDR’s efforts.”).
Braver, supra note 33, at 2793 (explaining that “[b]ecause court packing is irreversible, the sole form
of available retaliation is more packing, an escalatory pattern that is lethal for the Supreme Court”).
Michael J. Klarman, Foreword: The Degradation of American Democracy—And the Court, 134
HARV. L. REV. 1, 242 (2020) (citing STEVEN LEVITSKY & DANIEL ZIBLATT, HOW DEMOCRACIES
DIE 215–16 (2018)).
But see Will Baude, Why Isn’t Court-Packing Unconstitutional?, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Oct.
31, 2020, 8:02 AM), https://reason.com/volokh/2020/10/31/why-isnt-court-packing-unconstitutional/
(arguing that the constitutionality of court-packing is at least debatable).
See generally Doerfler & Moyn, supra note 4, at 51 (highlighting both personnel and disempowering
reform proposals).
Doerfler & Moyn, supra note 4, at 57 (noting that the absence of institutional intervention “affects
both personnel and disempowering reforms alike”).
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changes, but disempowering changes—standing alone—might be unable to
survive judicial review without substantial personnel changes.
*
*
*
As this Part demonstrates, the legislative anticipation of judicial review
alone profoundly shapes the content of court reform proposals and the
comparison between those proposals. But what if Congress did not feel bullied
into proposing a watered-down plan from the outset? What if the alternative
to full and immediate implementation was not complete invalidation?

II. ACTIVE FRAMING: SETTING THE TERMS OF INTERBRANCH
DIALOGUE
Given that the entire court reform debate focuses specifically on regulating
a coordinate branch, surprisingly little scholarship interrogates the process
through which this new institutional settlement will unfold. And with
substantive policies and analysis so focused on reining in the Court’s
institutional power, the failure to identify and challenge the supposed
advantage of inertia and time ascribed to the Court constitutes a curious gap
in the literature and the popular debate.
In this Part, I propose two ways Congress could proactively offset
interbranch inequalities in both the substantive and procedural design of any
court reform package. These approaches will strengthen Congress’s
bargaining position vis-à-vis the Court and can be applied to any number of
substantive reform proposals. And while these approaches minimize the
power differential between the Court and Congress in the specific interbranch
dialogue at issue, they do not rely on any broader challenge to judicial review
or judicial supremacy.76

A. Constitutional Safeguarding: Inertia v. Layered Design
The first approach is to build any court reform legislation in a series of
substantive policy layers, with each layer’s operational status contingent on a
constitutional ruling by the Court. Rather than Congress bearing the inertial
cost of the Court’s unpredictability, both parties would bear the cost equally.
76

Although judicial supremacy may be worth challenging through a variety of cultural, legal, and
political avenues over time, that is a more complex and charged topic beyond the scope of this Article.
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If the Court deems the first-preference policy unconstitutional, the secondpreference policy takes its place. If the Court deems the second-preference
policy unconstitutional, the third-preference policy takes its place—and so on.
In short, the Court would remain entitled to act on the legislation, but it
could not wage a war of attrition against Congress by leveraging the power of
inertia and forcing Congress to consider the question anew with each round.
Constitutionally safeguarding legislation through layered design could
open valuable spaces in the court reform debate that are currently closed off.
First, it allows for a cleaner debate over the relative merits of various reform
options. Once the risk of wholesale invalidation is replaced with a next-best
alternative policy, the debate can proceed undistorted by strategic
considerations about what the Court might decide. Consider how the merits
of court-packing compare to other design options when the downside risk is
no longer complete policy failure.77
Second, layered design creates new coalitional opportunities by increasing
the bargaining zone available to legislators. Legislators can reserve higher
layers for their most politically preferred policies and lower layers for those
designs most certain to survive judicial review. For example, a progressive
legislator might not be willing to vote for a senior-status approach that includes
a grandfather clause because such a plan would lock in conservative control in
the near term and reward norm-breaking behavior by Republicans.78 If the
grandfather clause were removed, however, the legislator might be on board.
Inversely, a moderate legislator might find court-packing too radical as a
standalone plan but might be willing to reconsider their stance on the Court’s
size if they knew in advance that such a proposal would only be triggered if the
Court had already invalidated multiple other layers of their preferred policies.
In short, taking a layered approach to court reform could bring more
robust options to the table, expand the scope of debate, and enhance the odds
Congress enacts reforms that it prefers rather than designing legislation from
a defensive crouch shaped by an unwarranted sense of institutional passivity.79
77
78

79

See supra Part I.B. for the comparison of court-packing against other policy designs.
See Adam Chilton, Daniel Epps, Kyle Rozema & Maya Sen, Designing Supreme Court Term Limits,
S. CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3788497
(manuscript at 3) (explaining that the average time to transition all nine justices to serve eighteen-year
terms is sixteen years without the grandfather clause and fifty-two years with the grandfather clause).
To be clear, such an approach is not meant to cast off the risks associated with legal uncertainty per
se; instead, it is meant to cast off the risk of institutional unpredictability. A legislator might reasonably
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And while such substantive “backup” provisions are not common,80 nor
are they novel or unprecedented—an important political and legal strength in
this context.
Case law (albeit limited) suggests that the Supreme Court would dutifully
follow the prescribed instructions of a layered design.81 In Bowshar v. Synar,
the Supreme Court faced a backup provision within the Gramm-RudmanHollings Act.82 Having determined that the Act as structured contained a
constitutional infirmity, the Court reflected on some of the nettlesome
severability questions raised by its decision.83 “Fortunately,” the Court
observed, “this is a thicket we need not enter” for “[t]he language of the [Act]
itself settles the issue.”84
After noting that “Congress ha[d] explicitly provided ‘fallback’ provisions
in the Act that take effect ‘[i]n the event . . . any of the reporting procedures
. . . are invalidated,’”85 the Court held that “[t]he fallback provisions are ‘fully
operative as a law’”86 and obviated any need for the Court to “perform the type

80
81

82
83
84
85
86

believe a policy is constitutional while being skeptical (or just unsure) that the policy would survive
judicial review given the current composition of the Court.
Dorf, infra note 79, at 305 (“Less commonly, fallback law takes the form of substitute provisions . . .
.”).
The Court also briefly discussed backup provisions in both McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003)
and Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010), but these references offer less persuasive precedent
because the backup provisions at issue were irrelevant to the analysis. In McConnell, for example,
the majority upheld “all applications of the primary definition and accordingly ha[d] no occasion to
discuss the backup definition.” McConnell, 540 U.S. at 190 n.73. Four Justices, meanwhile, would
have held that both the primary and the backup provisions were invalid. See Michael C. Dorf,
Fallback Law, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 303, 307 n.12 (citing McConnell, 540 U.S. at 277–78 (Thomas,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also id. at 337–38 (Kennedy, J., joined by Rehnquist,
C.J., and, in relevant part, Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)); see also Citizens
United, 558 U.S. at 327–28 (“The Snowe–Jeffords Amendment operates as a backup provision that
only takes effect if the Wellstone Amendment is invalidated.”).
Of course, one might see these discussions as partial support given that none of the Justices
questioned whether the relevant backup provision was suspect based on its contingent nature. See,
e.g., McConnell, 540 U.S. at 337–38 (Kennedy, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and, in relevant part,
Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“As I would invalidate § 203 under the primary
definition, it is necessary to add a few words about the backup provision . . . . I would also invalidate
the ban on electioneering communication under the backup definition.”) (emphasis added).
See 478 U.S. 714, 735–36 (1986) (noting that the court’s holding “permits the fallback provisions to
come into play”).
Id. at 734.
Id. at 735.
Id. at 735 (quoting 26 U.S.C. § 274(f)(1)) (emphasis omitted).
Id. (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 108 (1976) (quoting Champlin Refiining. Co. v. Corp.
Comm’n of Oklahoma, 286 U.S. 210, 234 (1932))).
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of creative and imaginative statutory surgery” that might otherwise occur after
a severability analysis.87
Moreover, the Supreme Court’s references (and citations) to severability
in Bowsher raise a broader point about first principles and the separation of
powers.88 As Professor Michael Dorf observes in his essential work on the
topic, substantive backup provisions are themselves a subset of a much
broader category of “fallback law” that includes severability provisions.89 After
all, a “truncated law is not simply smaller; it is also different from the original
law.”90 Given that a normal severability analysis involves judicial speculation
about what the legislature might have wanted,91 it would be odd to claim that
courts are somehow “better situated than legislatures to make the policy-laden
choice between partial invalidation, complete invalidation, and substitute
provisions[.]”92
As Professor Dorf notes, “no workable system of judicial review could
function without a large role for severability” and a categorical rejection of
fallback law would be a radical (if not impossible) position for the Court to
take.93 To the extent other meaningful objections exist to layering, I will address
these in Part III.C.

B. Political Safeguarding: Time v. Custom Appellate Procedures
The second approach is to design a unique appellate procedure to govern
challenges to the constitutionality of the court-reform package. Congress has
the power to regulate the jurisdiction of inferior federal courts pursuant to its
87
88
89
90

91

92
93

Id. at 736.
See Dorf, supra note 81, at 306, n.11 (referencing how “[b]oth Buckley and Champlin Refining
involved severability rather than substitutive fallback provisions”).
See generally id. at 305.
Id. As Professor Dorf discusses, “[the] point is easy to see in a case like United States v. Booker,” in
which the Supreme Court held that “the portion of the [Federal Sentencing Guidelines] mandating
the[ir] imposition . . . was severable.” Id. at 305–06. “After all, a regime of advisory guidelines
operates very differently from a regime of mandatory ones. The new regime is not simply the old
one minus some now-eliminated part; it has its own distinctive characteristics.” Id. at 306.
Fred Kameny, Are Inseverability Clauses Constitutional?, 68 ALB. L. REV. 997, 1000 (2005) (stating
that a court’s severability analysis “is guesswork by definition” and that “it is understandable for
legislators to fear that the courts might guess wrong”).
Dorf, supra note 81, at 370.
Id. at 310, 370 (discussing how “[a] real rule of nonseverability would treat any invalid provision of
law as invalidating the entire legal code. Thus, real nonseverability is never an option for a court, and
so, for courts as well as legislatures, the question is never whether to sever, but how much to sever or
what kind of fallback to utilize.”).
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powers under Article III, Section 1,94 and Congress has the power to regulate
the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article III, Section 2.95
There are two main reasons for Congress to exercise this power and craft
custom-tailored appellate procedures for the review of court reform
legislation. First, the typically slow pace of litigation combined with the Court’s
default power of discretionary review gives the Court an unnecessary time
advantage in the interbranch exchange. If the Justices believe their decision
will be unpopular with the political coalition that enacted the reform package,
the Court could delay any final ruling in the hopes that an intervening election
will strengthen its hand by weakening the political coalition that sought to
regulate it. Second, consolidating challenges and funneling them through a
single court (or a single vertical chain of courts) is particularly helpful when
backup provisions are in play to avoid a fracturing of lower-court decisions that
might purport to trigger competing provisions.96
To ensure that the political coalition that passed the law has a chance to
respond to any potentially unexpected decisions by the Court (including
wholesale invalidation), Congress should include several features in its reform
bill. First, Congress should make the Supreme Court’s appellate review
mandatory, carving out an exception to the Court’s default certiorari
procedures.97 Second, Congress should funnel all challenges through a single
venue such as the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, if any lower court at
all.98 Finally, Congress should require any court facing a challenge to the law to
94

95

96
97

98

U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme
Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish .”
(emphasis added)).
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (“In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls,
and those in which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction. In all
the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to
Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.”
(emphasis added)).
See Dorf, supra note 81, at 309, 359–63.
The vast majority of cases filed at the Court fall within the Court's discretionary jurisdiction and are
denied review at the certiorari stage. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (providing for direct appeal from
three-judge district courts in a limited set of cases); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1254 (indicating that courts
of appeals cases may be reviewed by the Supreme Court).
See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(g)(4)(A), (H) (requiring that constitutional challenges to certain trade
agreement settlement systems “may be brought only in the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit” and “shall be reviewable by appeal directly to the Supreme Court of
the United States”). Although allowing any court, such as the D.C. Circuit, to weigh in prior to the
Supreme Court creates time-delay concerns, it may be worth having a disinterested (or at least “less
interested”) set of judges examine and rule on the issues presented first.
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advance the case to the front of its docket, carving out an exception to the
general discretion vested in federal courts by the Priorities Act.99
All of these are well-worn methods of appellate regulation, but the last—
forcing the Court to issue a prompt ruling—is particularly critical to safeguard
Congress’s authority. Before 1984, Congress had enacted tens of dozens of
“prioritization” provisions over the years,100 creating a patchwork of demands
that became functionally impossible for federal courts to observe.101 With the
Priorities Act,102 Congress largely wiped the slate clean, reserving only a handful
of special cases for priority consideration103 and otherwise granting courts wide
discretion to organize their dockets as they saw fit.104 And while congressional
policy generally disfavors “the creation of any new civil priorities,”105 it seems

99

100
101

102

103

104

105

See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1657 [hereinafter Priorities Act] (providing each federal court discretion on
how civil actions are heard and determined, except for habeas corpus and recalcitrant witness
actions).
See Pub. L. No. 98-620, § 402, 98 Stat. 3335 (1984) (providing a list of enacted and amended
“prioritization” provisions).
See H.R. REP. NO. 98-985, at *7 (1984), as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5779, 5784–85
(discussing the newly amended prioritization laws and the difficulties presented by their
implementation).
28 U.S.C. § 1657 (“Notwithstanding any other provision of law, each court of the United States shall
determine the order in which civil actions are heard and determined, except that the court shall
expedite the consideration of any action brought under chapter 153 or section 1826 of this title, any
action for temporary or preliminary injunctive relief, or any other action if good cause therefor is
shown. For purposes of this subsection, ‘good cause’ is shown if a right under the Constitution of the
United States or a Federal Statute (including rights under section 552 of title 5) would be maintained
in a factual context that indicates that a request for expedited consideration has merit.”).
See Freedom Commc’ns Inc. v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 157 F.R.D. 485, 486 (C.D. Cal. 1994)
(“[C]ertain specific actions are named the highest priority civil actions—habeas corpus actions,
recalcitrant witness actions and actions for preliminary or temporary injunctive relief. The Act
encourages the courts to give special consideration to actions asserting federal rights. Regarding
FOIA, the text states only that the rights granted by FOIA are among the federal rights worthy of
special consideration. As there is no reason to suppose the converse, the special designation makes
FOIA actions first among equals.”).
See id. (“[T]he 1984 Act repealed some eighty individual prioritization provisions and enacted
section 1657. . . . The Act grants a court wide discretion to organize its docket.”); 75 AM. JUR. 2D
Trial § 22 (2020) (“The federal statute concerning the priority of civil actions grants the court wide
discretion to organize its docket, and it is procedurally proper for a party to move for an expedited
consideration under the statute, as Congress contemplated case-by-case decision making.”).
H.R. REP. NO. 98-985, at 4 (1984). Interestingly, providing expedited consideration to a wider range
of statutes could be one strategy to raise the profile and urgency of the court-reform debate by forcing
the Court to grapple with Democratic policies sooner rather than later. See Mark Tushnet
(@Mark_Tushnet),
TWITTER
(Oct.
18,
2020,
9:39
AM),
https://twitter.com/Mark_Tushnet/status/1317822571941953537 et seq. (proposing such a
procedure for fast-tracking judicial review).
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fair to say that finalizing the structure of the Supreme Court itself should be
priority number one.
Given Congress’s explicit constitutional authority to regulate the appellate
procedures of the Supreme Court, such a prioritization requirement hardly
seems subject to challenge.106 Federal courts have routinely observed the
Priorities Act’s requirements in managing their dockets,107 and a mere
prioritization command raises none of the more complex questions posed by
legislation that imposes time limits on judicial decision-making.108
*
*
*
By layering its substantive policies in a series of contingent provisions and
setting out a bespoke appellate process to govern any challenges to those
provisions, Congress has the power to reject an institutionally passive posture
in its interbranch dialogue with the Supreme Court. None of the proposals
above tread new ground or challenge the Court’s prerogative to review the
constitutionality of Congress’s legislation; instead, they merely set aside
assumptions about the transition to a new judicial design that have
unnecessarily constrained the scholarly and legislative imagination.
III. A LAYERED PROPOSAL FOR SUPREME COURT REFORM
Building on these insights and approaches, I provide a sample reform
proposal in Section A, discuss the benefits and risks of the layers offered in
Section B, and evaluate some of the potential objections to the layered
structure as a whole in Section C.
106 See, e.g., Zukowski v. Howard, Needles, Tammen, & Bergendoff, 115 F.R.D. 53, 55 (D. Colo. 1987)
(discussing the constitutional authority for the Priorities Act).
107 See, e.g., Fresenius Kabi USA, LLC v. Nebraska, 733 F. App’x. 871, 871–72 (8th Cir. 2018) (granting
motion for expedited appeal brought in part under the Priorities Act where plaintiff sought to enjoin
Nebraska from using drugs produced by plaintiff in an execution); Van Hollen v. Fed. Election
Comm’n, Nos. 12-5117, 12-5118, 2012 WL 1758569, at *1 (D.C. Cir. May 14, 2012) (citing Priorities
Act when granting expedited appeal); Kiyemba v. Bush, Nos. 08-5424, 08-5425, 08-5426, 08-5427,
08-5428, 08-5429, 2008 WL 4898963, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 20, 2008) (expediting appeals under
Priorities Act); In re Hicks, 118 F. App’x. 778, at *1 (4th Cir. 2005) (invoking the Priorities Act as a
reason to order the lower court to act on a prisoner’s habeas petition); Serono Lab’ys, Inc. v. Shalala,
No. 97-5188, 1998 WL 744103, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 12, 1998) (citing Priorities Act when granting
expedition); Gregorio T. v. Wilson, 54 F.3d 599, 600 (9th Cir. 1995) (referring to the Priorities Act
in an order granting a motion to expedite an appeal of a preliminary injunction decision).
108 See, e.g., William F. Ryan, Rush to Judgment: A Constitutional Analysis of Time Limits on Judicial
Decisions, 77 B.U. L. REV. 761, 807–10 (1997) (outlining objections to time limits being imposed
on courts' consideration of cases).
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A. Regularizing Appointments & Restoring Jurisdiction
The proposal uses three layers of policy to advance two primary goals:
regularizing appointments to the Court and reining in the Court’s discretionary
jurisdiction. As discussed in Part II.B., any challenges to the Act should be
advanced to the front of the docket and be subject to mandatory appeal either
directly to the Supreme Court or via the D.C. Circuit.

1. Layer One
To regularize appointments and prevent partisan capture of the Court, the
Act would designate Justices (including sitting Justices) who have served
eighteen years as “senior Justices.” The Act would also set a confirmation
timetable to approve nominations in each odd-numbered year, with senior
Justices automatically filling vacant seats until the next scheduled appointment.
In other words, Justices Thomas and Breyer would immediately become
senior Justices while continuing to serve in their own vacant seats. (If Congress
passed the Act in 2021, for example, President Biden would fill Thomas’s seat
in 2021 and Breyer’s seat in 2023.) Senior Justices would continue to serve by
designation on the courts of appeals.
To temper the Court’s discretionary control over its own docket and to
reduce its ability to actively shape doctrine through strategic case selection, the
Act would also reinvigorate the courts’ of appeals certification power. As
Professors Craig S. Lerner and Nelson Lund have suggested, Congress should
amend 28 U.S.C. § 1254 to include a provision that “each Term, the number
of cases taken by the Supreme Court pursuant to the first paragraph
(discretionary certiorari petitions) may not exceed the number of cases taken
pursuant to the second paragraph (court of appeals certifications).”109
If the Supreme Court invalidates any provision within Layer One, the
entire layer would become inoperable and Layer Two would take effect as
operative law.

2. Layer Two
The next continent layer would retain the same policy goals as the first
layer but reflect a more constitutionally robust structure.
109 Craig S. Lerner & Nelson Lund, Judicial Duty and the Supreme Court’s Cult of Celebrity, 78 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1255, 1289 (2010).
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To regularize appointments the Act would follow a model proposed by
Professor Jack Balkin, in which Congress creates two en banc courts: one
consisting of all active Justices to decide cases under the Court’s original
jurisdiction, and one consisting of the nine Justices most junior in service to
decide cases under the Court’s appellate jurisdiction.110 Appointments would,
again, take place in every odd-numbered year, ensuring that nearly all cases
arising under the Court’s appellate jurisdiction are heard by a set of nine
Justices, each serving eighteen years. Although the total size of the Court would
admittedly expand under this model, the number of Justices hearing the
Court’s most important cases would remain at nine.
To even more rigorously ensure that the Court’s discretionary control over
its agenda was not used to pursue aggressively partisan ends, this layer would
also include a modification of the Court’s certiorari procedures. Rather than
the Court’s informal “Rule of Four” (which states that the Court will grant
certiorari to any petition receiving four votes), the Act would impose a new
supermajority rule requiring a two-thirds vote to deny certiorari. Although the
logic behind this approach will be discussed below, such a supermajority rule
might marginally reduce the Court’s agenda-setting power.
If the Supreme Court invalidated any provision within Layer Two, the
entire layer would become inoperable and Layer Three would take effect as
operative law.

3. Layer Three
The third layer would retain the same policy goals as above but provide
the strongest possible constitutional foundation as a final backup.
To regularize appointments, the Act would do away with any fixed number
of Justices or bifurcated court structure. Instead, two seats would be
automatically added to the Court at the start of any presidential term in which
there were no pre-existing vacancies.111 In short, the size of the Court would
110 See BALKIN, supra note 24 at 152–53 (proposing judicial reforms); see also Jack M. Balkin, Don’t
Pack the Court. Regularize Appointments, BALKINIZATION (Oct 5, 2020),
https://balkin.blogspot.com/2020/10/dont-pack-court-regularize-appointments.html; Jennings &
Acharya, supra note 4, at 414 (“The only jurisdiction Article III mandates that the Supreme Court
have is its original jurisdiction.”).
111 For a similar suggestion, see Daniel Hemel, Can Structural Changes Fix the Supreme Court?, 35 J.
ECON. PERSPS. 119, 136–37 (2021) (advocating for a “decoupling” of appointments and retirements
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automatically expand and contract to ensure that each term the president
could fill two vacancies. As above, confirmations could be scheduled to take
place in every odd-numbered year.
And given the increased capacity that this expanded structure would
provide to hear cases under the full court’s appellate jurisdiction, the Act
would require a unanimous vote to deny certiorari.

B. Policy Benefits & Objections
The structure above offers a pair of policies that would proportionally
respond to recent norm violations, immediately establish a stable new norm,
provide no partisan advantage over time, rely on historical practices for
constitutional authority, and redress troubling judicial and political trends that
have caused bipartisan concern over recent decades. And the particular layers
proposed would allow for all actors (Republican and Democratic; legislative
and judicial) to converge on a new institutional consensus that respects their
varying perspectives, interests, and constitutional duties.

1. Regularizing Appointments
The first policy advanced by the proposal is to regularize the appointment
process, ensuring that each president has an equal opportunity to appoint two
Justices following every presidential election and that senators have a chance
to influence the confirmation process of one Justice following every
congressional election. This policy would respond to trends that have drawn
concern from both sides of the aisle over the past several decades and restore
an equilibrium more consistent with historical practice.
From the earliest days of the Republic, the Supreme Court was structured
to strike a careful balance: Justices needed to be insulated from political
pressures to ensure decisional independence (i.e., the “ability to issue a ruling
without fear of sanctions”)112 but also needed to remain sufficiently in touch
with society to prevent the emergence of a powerful and unaccountable
juristocracy.

and the addition of “two justices at the beginning of each [presidential] term, regardless of how many
vacancies have occurred or will occur”).
112 Grove, Judicial Independence, supra note 1, at 472; see also Jackson, supra note 60, at 967–68
(describing the degrees to which certain accountability mechanisms and political responses to
unpopular rulings undermine and promote judicial independence).
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As a matter of constitutional design, “[t]he language and history of the
Good Behavior Clause, viewed in the light of the circumstances of the time,”
struck this balance fairly well.113 On the one hand, judges received an explicit
promise of undiminished salary and an implicit promise of life tenure (at least
according to the most common readings).114 On the other hand, the
appointments process itself provided a “direct and important formal source of
democratic control,” given average life expectancy at the time.115 Between 1789
and 1970, Justices served an average of fifteen years, which allowed vacancies
on the Court to open up once every two years.116
This design—with its regular infusion of new judges—ensured that the
Supreme Court could not become “completely divorced from democratic
accountability.”117 After all, the system could have been designed “to allow the
Justices to elect their own successors,” but “we do not allow the Justices to pick
their own successors . . . precisely because we believe that the judiciary, just
like the legislature and the executive, needs to be subject to popular control
and to the system of checks and balances.”118
The Constitution also provides Congress extensive control over the
structure and design of the judiciary as a whole119—powers that Congress used
early and often to foster public trust, to promote democratic legitimacy, and
to prevent the Justices from becoming too isolated from society.120 The most
113
114

115
116
117
118
119
120

Cramton, supra note 57, at 1316.
See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior courts, shall hold their
offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation,
which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.”); Saikrishna Prakash & Steven
D. Smith, How to Remove a Federal Judge, 116 YALE L.J. 72, 89 (2006) (observing that “[m]odern
judges, scholars, and politicians” tend to assume that “the term ‘good Behaviour’ was merely a code
phrase or term of art meaning ‘life tenure,’” and then disputing this reading of the “good Behaviour”
clause).
Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note 58, at 810.
Id. at 775.
Id. at 813.
Id. at 812. But see infra text accompanying notes 124–130 (describing the practice of timing
retirements to influence the ideological agenda of successor).
See U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1–2 (describing the structure of the judicial branch).
See Marin K. Levy, Visiting Judges, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 67, 93 (2019) (noting that circuit riding was
meant to “increase the public’s sense of the legitimacy of the federal judiciary”); see also Joshua Glick,
On the Road: The Supreme Court and the History of Circuit Riding, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 1753,
1754, 1761 (2003) (noting that one of the justifications behind circuit riding was to “enhance[] the
justices’ ability to contribute to the formation of national law by exposing them to local political
sentiments and legal practices”); cf. Steven G. Calabresi & David C. Presser, Reintroducing Circuit
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obvious early example was the requirement that the Justices sit regularly with
district court judges throughout the country to decide cases, a practice known
as “riding circuit” and thought to encourage these values.121 But “riding circuit”
is by no means the only example; Congress has long exercised a power to
flexibly structure the judiciary as a whole to respond to changing needs and
circumstances.122
Over the past fifty years, however, the power of the Court has grown while
the regular confirmation and appointment process has collapsed. Before
1970, Justices served an average of 15 years.123 Since 1970, Justices have served
an average of 26 years.124 The increased power and longevity of the Justices has
transformed a consistent and necessary source of democratic legitimacy into a
disturbing ritual where judges and politicians alike now work in tandem to gain

Riding: A Timely Proposal, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1386, 1388–89 (2006) (proposing that Justices of the

121

122

123
124

present day be required to ride circuit for a four-week session in July so that they stay in touch with
popular opinion).
See Levy, supra note 120, at 93 (“[B]y adjudicating cases and spending time in towns and cities outside
of Washington D.C., the Justices were to become more familiar with the laws and customs of different
localities.”); see also Calabresi & Presser, supra note 120, at 1386 n.1 (quoting 33 ANNALS OF CONG.
125–26 (1819) (statement of Sen. Smith)) (“Sir, in a country like this, it is of some importance that
your judges should ride the circuits . . . that they may not forget the genius and temper of their
government.”); id. at 1386–87 n.2 (quoting 2 REG. DEB. 932 (1826) (statement of Rep. Buchanan))
(“If the Supreme Court should ever become a political tribunal, it will not be until the Judges shall
be settled in Washington, far removed from the People, and within the immediate influence of the
power and patronage of the Executive.”); David R. Stras, Why Supreme Court Justices Should Ride
Circuit Again, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1710, 1710–11 n.1 (2007) (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 30th Cong., 1st
Sess. 596 (1848) (statement of Sen. Badger regarding a bill that would have ended the practice of
circuit riding)) (“[W]e shall have these gentlemen as judges of the Supreme Court . . . not felt, and
understood, and realized as part and parcel of this great popular Government; but sitting here alone—
becoming philosophical and speculative in their inquires as to law . . . unseen, final arbiters of justice,
issuing their decrees as it were from a secret chamber—moving invisibly amongst us, as far as the
whole community is concerned; and, in my judgment, losing in fact the ability to discharge their duties
as well as that responsive confidence of the people, which adds so essentially to the sanction of all
acts of the officers of Government.”).
See, e.g., Levy, supra note 120, at 71–72 (discussing a “tradition of fluidity within the court structure”);
see generally Michael E. Solimine, The Three-Judge District Court in Voting Rights Litigation, 30 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 79, 81 (1996) (discussing how three-judge district courts “significantly affect the
functioning of the American political system”).
Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note 58, at 775.
Id. at 771. Calabresi and Lindgren track from 1970 to 2005. Id. The average has remained steady
since then. It is 25.6 from 1970–2000; and it remains at 26.1 if one omits Justice Souter who took
senior status after roughly 18 years—an unusual step by modern standards. Id. at 795 n.75.
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partisan control of the judicial branch despite the unrepresentative and
delegitimating consequences.125
From the judicial side, it is no secret that Justices (and judges) strategically
time their retirements to influence the ideological agenda of the successor to
their seat.126 And this “soft” form of judicial control may be sharpening. Justice
Kennedy, it is reported, suggested to President Trump that he consider Brett
Kavanaugh for the “next” Supreme Court opening.127 Once Trump added
Kavanaugh’s name to his public list of potential picks, Justice Kennedy then
retired—creating a space for his chosen successor to ascend to his seat.128
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s final “most fervent wish”—to “not be
replaced until a new president is installed”129—was a rare, public expression of
a trend that is widely recognized but rarely appreciated for its constitutional
implications.130 If judges are not supposed to select their own successors,131 then
the operation of our current system is—to an extent—out of step with the
constitutional design.132

125 Acknowledging that judges are not (and cannot be) genuinely “neutral” or “nonpartisan” in any kind
of objective sense does not undermine (and, in fact, enhances) the importance that judges be broadly
representative for the operation of law to be (and be viewed as) legitimate.
126 See Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note 58, at 841 (calling for an end to this practice); Carrington &
Cramton, supra note 57 (noting the incentives supporting the practice); Judith Resnik, Judicial
Selection and Democratic Theory: Demand, Supply, and Life Tenure, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 579,
615 (2005). To be sure, this “timing” is not always successful. See Cramton, supra note 57, at 1322
(“Justice Black attempted to survive the Nixon presidency, and Justice Douglas attempted to survive
both Nixon and then Ford, but both Justices failed. Justices Brennan and Marshall attempted to
survive Reagan, and they also failed.”).
127 Robert Barnes, Justice Kennedy Asked Trump to Put Kavanaugh on Supreme Court List, Book
Says,
WASH.
POST
(Nov.
21,
2019,
3:03
PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/justice-kennedy-asked-trump-to-put-kavanaughon-supreme-court-list-book-says/2019/11/21/3495f684-0b0f-11ea-8397-a955cd542d00_story.html.
128 Id.
129 John Nichols, Ruth Bader Ginsburg: ‘My Most Fervent Wish Is That I Will Not Be Replaced Until
a
New
President
Is
Installed,’
NATION
(Sept.
18,
2020),
https://www.thenation.com/article/politics/ruth-bader-ginsburg-fervent/.
130 Cf. Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV.
2312, 2314 (2006) (drawing attention to how “the invisibility of political parties has left constitutional
discourse about separation of powers with no conceptual resources to understand basic features of
the American political system” and has “generated judicial decisions and theoretical rationalizations
that float entirely free of any functional justification grounded in the actual workings of separation of
powers”).
131 See supra text accompanying notes 112–118.
132 See supra text accompanying notes 136–130.
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From the political side, the picture has been more complicated. On the
one hand, the increased lifespan and power of the Justices significantly raises
the stakes of every appointment.133 And, with the “democratic instillation of
public values on the Court through the selection of new judges” becoming
“infrequent and irregular,”134 confirmation hearings have become partisan lifeor-death events as senators seek to impact the political skew of the judicial
branch as much as possible before the brief “window” for influence closes.135
On the other hand, the availability of Supreme Court vacancies has—at least in
recent history136—remained outside political control.
That is not to say the system has not been unrepresentative. But the source
of that unrepresentative skew in recent history has been a product of dumb
luck or judicial manipulation of vacancy-timing. For example, “Presidents Taft
and Harding made six and four Supreme Court appointments, respectively,
while Woodrow Wilson made only three appointments despite serving longer
as President than both Taft and Harding combined.”137 Similarly, Richard
Nixon appointed four Justices over five years, while Jimmy Carter appointed
none over four years.138

133 See Carrington & Cramton, supra note 57 (arguing that giving Supreme Court justices life tenure has
resulted in a series of negative consequences); Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note 58, at 771 (“[T]he
combination of less frequent vacancies and longer tenures of office means that when vacancies do
arise, there is so much at stake that confirmation battles have become much more intense.”).
134 Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note 58, at 811 (citing DiTullio & Schochet, supra note 44, at 1116–19)
(“[Y]ears will pass without any openings and, suddenly, two, three, or even four seats may open up
within the space of a few years, followed by another long period without any vacancies. When this
happens, the party in power at that particular time has a disproportionate impact on the Supreme
Court, which can again prevent the American people from being able regularly to check the
Court . . . .”).
135 To be sure, without broader changes reining in the Supreme Court’s power, “determining the
ideological character of the Supreme Court would remain an enormously high-stakes affair” even
with regularized appointments. Doerfler & Moyn, supra note 4, at 45. But regular appointments
might be expected to at least lower those stakes, and that would be a marked improvement. See
Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note 58, at 836 (“The regularization of vacancies on the Court and the
more frequent appointments to the Court would make each appointment less important politically
and should have a net effect of reducing the politicization of the process.”). Novelty, after all, is a
strong tool in cultivating attention. See G. Michael Parsons, Fighting for Attention: Democracy, Free
Speech, and the Marketplace of Ideas, 104 MINN. L. REV. 2157, 2202–03 (2020) (discussing how
news media has historically used attention-grabbing headlines to stimulate reader interest and how
inflammatory headlines are used today).
136 See Grove, Judicial Independence, note 1, at 505–17 (discussing the development of the negative
norm against court-packing).
137 Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note 58, at 812.
138 Id.
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These dynamics disrupted the constitutional balance between
independence and representativeness, but at least that imbalance did not result
from legislative manipulation.
Senator McConnell’s recent maneuvering shattered this already-uneasy
truce, deepening the unrepresentative skew of the Court. It is now the case
that fifteen of the last twenty Supreme Court Justices have been nominated by
Republicans,139 even though Republicans have lost the popular vote in seven
of the last eight presidential elections.140
Regularizing appointments to the Supreme Court through a statutory
scheme that is immediately implemented fixes these dangerous trends,
responds to the recent violation of norms to discourage future violations,
implements a stable scheme going forward, and restores the appointment
process’s traditional role as a constitutional check to maintain the judiciary’s
balance between independence and accountability.141
The three layers proposed by the plan follow the structure set out in Part
II, with the most politically preferable policy set out in Layer One and the
most constitutionally predictable policy set out in Layer Three. Because the
literature already covers the “standalone” legality of various reform proposals,
I will only engage with the legal arguments briefly below to help explain their
relative ordering.

i. Layer One: Requiring Senior Status After Eighteen Years
From a political perspective, leading with an eighteen-year senior-status
requirement carries several benefits. First, it brings the service of active Justices
back in line with the average historical tenure of Justices and in line with the
implicit value tradeoffs underlying the constitutional design.142

Court
Nominations
(1789–Present),
U.S.
SENATE,
139 Supreme
https://www.senate.gov/legislative/nominations/SupremeCourtNominations1789present.htm (last
visited Jan. 26, 2021).
140 Elaine Kamarck & John Hudak, How to Get Rid of the Electoral College, BROOKINGS (Dec. 9,
2020), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2020/12/09/how-to-get-rid-of-the-electoral-college/.
141 See Ryan, supra note 108, at 797 (“[J]udicial independence is not an end in itself, but rather a means
of securing other goals, most notably that of ensuring that litigants and potential litigants will receive
impartial judicial decisions[,] . . . preserv[ing] clear lines of public accountability for both the judicial
and the political branches[,] . . . and reduc[ing] the risk of arbitrary decisions, something the Framers
knew was critical to the judiciary’s legitimacy.”).
142 See Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note 58 at 775 (providing support for an eighteen-year term).
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Second, it respects the political, social, and psychological attachment to
having nine active Justices—a number fixed since 1869.143 Whether or not one
believes the current manifestation of the Court (in its unrepresentative form)
is worth “saving,”144 the more traditional and aspirational conception of the
Court (as an institution kept broadly “small-r” republican through regular
appointments) would be worth “saving.”145 And the more any new norm can to
carry forward and communicate an earlier and more long-standing convention
to help foster continued acceptance, the better.
Finally, like the other policies below, a senior-status system operates over
the long run with no clear partisan valence, meaning that legislators can adopt
the reform behind a “veil of ignorance” as to its long-term effects.146
For these reasons, the concept of regularly rotating Justices off the bench
at regular intervals—whether via constitutional “term limits” requiring actual
retirement or via statutory service rotation requiring senior status—has been a
consistently popular reform over time and across ideological constituencies.147
Setting an eighteen-year senior-status requirement as “Layer One” also
opens up a unique opportunity given our current political moment: Congress
can enact the policy without including a grandfather clause to exempt sitting
Justices. Although proposals usually include this clause to address legal
concerns, the clause also serves a political purpose that one might consider

143 Marin K. Levy, Packing and Unpacking State Courts, 61 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1121, 1128 (2020).
144 See Doerfler & Moyn, supra note 4, at 6 (“Asking ‘how to save the Supreme Court’ is asking the
wrong question. For saving it is not a desirable goal; getting it out of the way of progressive reform
is.”).
145 See id. at 35 (“Term limits are . . . distinct among personnel reforms in that their democratizing effect
is systematic.”); Chilton, Epps, Rozema & Sen, supra note 78.
146 See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 136–142 (1971) (explaining the concept of the “veil of
ignorance”).
147 “Among the reforms [on offer], term[] limit[s] for Supreme Court Justices enjoy the most popular
support.” Doerfler & Moyn, supra note 4, at 21 (citing New Poll Shows SCOTUS Term Limits Still
Popular Across Party Lines, FIX THE COURT (June 10, 2020), https://fixthecourt.com/2020/06/latestscotus-term-limits-poll/ (finding that 77% of Americans support restrictions on length of service for
Supreme Court Justices in 2019)); Jeffrey Rosen, What If We Wrote the Constitution Today?,
ATLANTIC (Dec. 8, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/12/what-if-we-couldrewrite-constitution/617304/ (indicating bipartisan support for Supreme Court term limits); David R.
Stras & Ryan W. Scott, Retaining Life Tenure: The Case for a “Golden Parachute,” 83 WASH. U.
L.Q. 1397, 1400 (2005) (quoting John M. Broder & Carolyn Marshall, White House Memos Offer
Opinions on Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2005, at A11) (“Even Chief Justice John Roberts
argued in favor of term limits as a government lawyer.”).
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valuable under normal political conditions: removing short-term partisan
implications from the equation.
On the heels of a unilateral norm violation by Republicans, however, full
and immediate implementation of a senior-status requirement could be a
political benefit rather than a political liability. Because Justice Thomas would
typically be expected to “wait out” Biden’s term in office while Justice Breyer
might be expected to retire, immediate implementation would provide a shortterm proportionate response to McConnell’s norm violation (by rotating
Thomas out of active service) and long-term apolitical stability (by placing any
other partisan consequences beyond the next presidential election). Removing
the grandfather clause, in other words, ensures that a dangerous precedent is
not rewarded and that the plan itself can operate as a sufficiently assertive form
of anti-hardball.148
From a legal perspective, the constitutionality of a mandatory senior-status
requirement is at least plausible—and perhaps stronger than traditionally
assumed.149 To start, senior Justices still exercise the judicial power, still hear
cases, still exercise decisional independence in resolving those cases, still
receive full compensation, and arguably maintain the same “office” despite the

148 See generally David E. Pozen, Hardball and/as Anti-Hardball, 21 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y
949, 955 (2019) (“[S]ome of the most morally and democratically compelling forms of anti-hardball
may be unattainable without the aid of hardball . . . .”); see also Jurecic & Hennessey, supra note 3
(“All of these ideas [18-year terms, supermajorities, etc.] could help place the Court at arm’s length
from politics and restore its authority, but it’s hard to imagine why Republicans would assent to such
proposals unless the party knew that Democrats were willing to play hardball right back.”).
By omitting a grandfather clause, the proposed plan goes further than the typical 18-year term
proposals. Some might (understandably) say that even this isn’t sufficiently responsive or adequately
deterrent. Yet the disparate treatment of Garland and Barrett offers the most indisputable offense—
one that provides the clearest example of a shared norm violation and the strongest justification for
a corrective response.
Moreover, the fact that both Roberts and Alito would be “next up” after Thomas and Breyer
means Democrats would have the opportunity make more substantial inroads after the next
presidential election (moving from 6-3 now, to 5-4 in one term, and 3-6 after two terms) and
Republicans would have a chance to protect their majority (moving 6-3 now, to 5-4 in one term, and
5-4 after two terms).
It should be noted that a two-year “gap” would be required in 2033 to allow Justice Gorsuch to
serve 18 years.
149 See Carrington & Cramton, supra note 57 (arguing that a Justice’s “life tenure” can be read to include
service that starts “in the Supreme Court and moved to a lower court or vice versa”). But see Calabresi
& Lindgren, supra note 58, at 858–859 (identifying weaknesses in Carrington and Cramton’s
proposal).
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specific terms of that office not remaining constant over time.150 As the
Supreme Court suggested in Chandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit,
decisional independence is the constitutional core of judicial independence:
There can, of course, be no disagreement among us as to the imperative need
for total and absolute independence of judges in deciding cases or in any
phase of the decisional function. But it is quite another matter to say that each
judge in a complex system shall be the absolute ruler of his manner of
conducting judicial business.
151

And while riding circuit consistently over the course of one’s career is
different than riding circuit sequentially over the course of one’s career, the
relevant question is whether this distinction is of such constitutional weight that
the Good Behavior Clause prohibits Congress from enacting such a law.152
There are good reasons to believe legal objections based on the Good
Behavior Clause are weaker than the literature typically imagines. First, judicial
manipulation of appointments through strategic retirement, while lamented as
“unseemly,” is typically considered orthogonal to the question of
constitutionality.153 But given that the appointments process itself is supposed
to operate as a check on judicial power, a decision by Congress to safeguard
this check in a way that both honors decisional independence and combats
strategic retirements seems appropriate.
Second, when a convention associated with judicial independence is “not
clearly etched into our constitutional text and structure” but is merely
“constructed by political institutions over time,”154 a violation of one set of
existing norms may require changes to another set of adjacent norms to

150 Myths and Facts About SCOTUS Term Limits, FIX THE COURT (Nov. 25, 2019),
https://fixthecourt.com/2019/11/myth-facts-scotus-term-limits/; 28 U.S.C. § 371 (stating that judges
that take senior status “retain the office”). But see generally David R. Stras & Ryan W. Scott, Are
Senior Judges Unconstitutional?, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 453 (2007) (addressing the constitutionality
of senior judges).
151 398 U.S. 74, 84 (1970); see also Grove, Judicial Independence, supra note 1, at 472 (defining judicial
independence as decisional independence); Jackson, supra note 60, at 967–68 (discussing selection
and tenure rules that contribute to judicial independence).
152 See Carrington & Cramton, supra note 57 (arguing that the Good Behavior Clause does not so
prohibit Congress). See also Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299, 309 (1803) (upholding power of
Congress to require Supreme Court Justices to sit as lower court judges).
153 See Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note 58, at 841 (describing the practice as unseemly and as causing
the public to view the Court as political).
154 Grove, Judicial Independence, supra note 1, at 470; see also JOSH CHAFETZ, CONGRESS’S
CONSTITUTION: LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 102–07 (2017)
(discussing the early development of—and contests around—judicial structuring norms).
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reestablish institutional stability and prevent constitutional backsliding overall.
In other words, even if an eighteen-year senior-status requirement might seem
like it violates the Good Behavior Clause given past practice, the constitutional
weight of that practice cannot be easily separated from related practices that
fulfilled a supporting role.
Finally, the principle of judicial independence is itself protected by broader
structural safeguards; namely, Article I’s constitutional requirements of
bicameralism and presentment.155 Over the course of our country’s history,
these structural safeguards have provided the first line of defense against
targeted jurisdiction-stripping efforts156 and have provided stability to the design
of the federal court system overall. The very fact that the Judiciary is so
dependent on Congress for its structure and jurisdiction is, arguably, a vital
source of its democratic legitimacy.157
In short, if both the President and majorities in both the House of
Representatives and the Senate have decided that a change to the structure of
the federal court system is required in light of recent events to stabilize and
protect the impartiality, legitimacy, and independence of the judiciary, the
Supreme Court should be particularly cautious before imposing its own
implicit rule based on a more formal, practice-driven conception of

155 See Grove, Structural Safeguards, supra note 66, at 873 (“[T]he primary protection for many of our
most precious rights and liberties (of which the independent judiciary forms a crucial part) would be
structural.”). Traditionally, “scholars have assumed either that there must be judicially enforceable
limits on Congress’s power, or that there are no constitutional limits and the federal judicial power is
simply a matter of legislative will (or benevolence).” Id. As Professor Grove points out, this overlooks
how other structural features, such as bicameralism and the presidential veto, protect federal
jurisdiction.
Interestingly, the executive branch has also historically played a role in constraining jurisdictionstripping efforts. See Tara Leigh Grove, The Article II Safeguards of Federal Jurisdiction, 112
COLUM. L. REV. 250, 251–55, 268–86 (2012) (describing the executive branch’s efforts in protecting
the scope of federal jurisdiction).
156 See Grove, Structural Safeguards, supra note 66, at 929 (showing that the Court has, appropriately,
“indicated a willingness to enforce the jurisdictional limitations that survive the Article I lawmaking
process”).
157 As Professor Grove notes, this has “strong normative underpinnings.” Id. (“[T]he very existence of a
congressional power to limit federal jurisdiction can serve to legitimize judicial decisions. [As]
Professor Black explained: ‘Jurisdiction’ is the power to decide. If Congress has wide and deep-going
power over the courts’ jurisdiction, then the courts’ power to decide is a continuing and visible
concession from a democratically formed Congress.’ Thus, when Congress . . . leaves federal
jurisdiction in place, it signals (by its forbearance) that it has decided to trust certain matters to the
independent federal judiciary.”).
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“independence” arguably at odds with a deeper fidelity to the purposes
underlying the structure of Article III and the Constitution as a whole.

ii. Layer Two: Bifurcating Original & Appellate Jurisdiction
The advantage of layering policies, of course, is that Congress can express
a potential constitutional disagreement with the Court without forfeiting its
institutional power in the process. Because the runaway power of the Court is
itself a reason for reform, Layer Two ensures that the political will to achieve
regular appointments does not go to waste.
From a political perspective, structuring the Supreme Court so that only
the nine most junior Justices hear cases under the Court’s appellate
jurisdiction carries almost all the benefits described above. And while the
overall number of active Justices on the Court will swell beyond nine, original
jurisdiction cases only constitute a fraction of the Court’s docket.158
Perhaps one might object that the structure of the plan is more
complicated than court-packing or even a senior-status requirement,159 but that
could be as much of a political benefit as a political risk. The “takeaway” is
that nine Justices will continue to hear virtually all of the Supreme Court’s
cases and those nine Justices will serve in that capacity for eighteen years. The
burden of explaining any complexities beyond that would seem to fall most
heavily on those objecting to the design.
From a legal perspective, the measure seems strong but not without doubt.
The idea of limiting the Supreme Court to its original jurisdiction relies on a
widely accepted understanding of the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction,160 and
Congress could rely on its “tradition of fluidity” in judicial design to support
the bifurcated structure.161
158 See Balkin, supra note 110 (proposing a system in which a new Supreme Court Justice is appointed
in every odd-numbered year); see also Jurisdiction: Original, Supreme Court, FEDERAL JUDICIAL
CENTER, https://www.fjc.gov/history/courts/jurisdiction-original-supreme-court (last accessed June
25, 2021) (“The Supreme Court's original docket has always been a minute portion of its overall
caseload.”).
159 See Doerfler & Moyn, supra note 4, at 62 (“What only law professors can understand, a popular
movement will never demand.”).
160 Jennings & Acharya, supra note 4, at 414 (“The only jurisdiction Article III mandates that the
Supreme Court have is its original jurisdiction.”).
161 Levy, supra note 120, at 71–72; see, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 46 (authorizing circuit courts to sit in panels).
Another approach might be to create a separate intermediary “Supreme Court of Appeals” between
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Still, one might object to the idea that this “tradition of fluidity” exists to
quite the same extent for the Supreme Court (given its constitutional stature)
and that Congress therefore cannot functionally strip only some Justices of
their appellate jurisdiction.162 Moreover, this kind of split might be viewed as
inconsistent with the text of Article III, which refers to the judicial power being
vested in “one supreme Court.”163
While this objection brings us into uncharted (or at least academic)
territory, adding a final, third layer provides an extra degree of comfort to the
aggregate reform package.

iii. Layer Three: Automatically Adding Seats
The final approach—automatically adding seats at regular, predetermined
intervals—is a kind of “court-packing lite.” From a political perspective,
legislators might find it unenticing as a first layer but more acceptable as a third
layer. A Member of Congress otherwise attached to the norm of nine Justices,
for example, might be open to an expanded Court knowing that the policy
would only activate if the Court itself rejects all other options.
Such an approach also avoids the political risk of escalation that could
come from a one-time attempt to expand the Court.164 An immediately
implemented “automatic additions” plan proportionally responds to past
abuse while promising political opponents a fair and equal opportunity to
influence future appointments after the next round of elections. This could

the circuit courts and the Supreme Court, although populating the seats of this court raises its own
unique complexities.
162 To be sure, this form of generalized jurisdiction-stripping does not raise the kind of “decisional
independence” questions, see infra note 226 (discussing Klein), or other “improper motive”
questions that often accompany jurisdiction-stripping, e.g., Fallon, supra note 67, at 1074–83
(stripping jurisdiction from federal courts on the assumption that state courts will not only be more
favorable to certain types of claims, but that this favorability will encourage state courts to openly defy
prior Supreme Court precedents). But, then again, lawyers—and Justices—are nothing if not creative.
163 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1; Tara Leigh Grove, The Exceptions Clause as a Structural Safeguard,
113 COLUM. L. REV. 929, 979 n.272 (2013) [hereinafter Grove, The Exceptions Clause] (providing
examples of Members of Congress and the Court disfavoring a panel system on the Supreme Court
based on the provision that there be “one supreme Court”).
164 Klarman, supra note 72, at 242 (“[R]eciprocal hardball can play into the hands of authoritarians by
alienating moderates, unifying autocratic forces, and even providing a pretext for government
repression.”).
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help the plan take root quickly, establish a new norm, and achieve stability
going forward.165
To be sure, this floating approach to composition could regularly lead to
an even number of Justices. One might reasonably object that the Supreme
Court should have an odd number so that the institution as a whole can speak
with one voice on most questions that come before it. Yet this raises important
normative questions about what role the Supreme Court can and should play
in society—questions to which we now turn.

2. Restoring Jurisdiction
Apart from the personnel changes above, coalitions from across the
political spectrum have proposed reining in the institutional power of the
Supreme Court over the years.166 And while these proposals normally take the
form of jurisdiction-stripping, some scholars have suggested another remedy:
“giving the Supreme Court more to do, not less.”167
The second policy advanced by the layered the proposal, then, is to
incrementally decrease the Supreme Court’s discretion over its case-selection
process. While not immediately intuitive, jurisdiction-restoring as a method
for disempowering the Court has strong political and legal advantages over
jurisdiction-stripping.
For more than the first hundred years of its existence, the Supreme Court
had no control over which cases it would decide.168 For the Framers,
mandatory jurisdiction provided a powerful reply to those who feared the
emergence of an “imperial judiciary.”169 In the Antifederalist Papers, Brutus
warned of Justices that were too independent: “[T]hey are independent of the
people, of the legislature, and of every power under heaven. Men placed in
this situation will generally soon feel themselves independent of heaven
165 See Epps & Sitaraman, supra note 20, at 152 (stating that a proposal to reform the Court “needs to
be stable going forward” and consist of something that “both sides might be able to live with in the
long term, leading to a fair equilibrium”).
166 See Doerfler & Moyn, supra note 4, at 64 (“[D]isempowering reforms can cut across existing partisan
configuration.”).
167 Lerner & Lund, supra note 109, at 1283; see BALKIN, supra note 24, at 154–55 (arguing that making
the Court “decide more cases, not less . . . may limit the Justices’ ability to shape litigation
campaigns.”).
168 Edward A. Hartnett, Questioning Certiorari: Some Reflections Seventy-Five Years After the Judges’
Bill, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1643, 1649 (2000).
169 Lerner & Lund, supra note 109, at 1262.
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itself.”170 Hamilton, responding in the Federalist Papers as Publius, wrote that
the judiciary should not be feared, for it could “take no active resolution
whatsoever” and had “neither Force nor Will, but merely judgment.”171
And, for a time, this characterization held. The early Supreme Court did
not control its docket, could only act on the cases that came before it, and
resolved all the cases that came before it, playing more of an “error-correction”
role than a “law-declaration” role.172 In the pre-Marshall Court, for example,
71% of reported opinions were brief and without attributed authorship, and
the Court issued opinions within days (or at most weeks) of oral argument.173
Mandatory jurisdiction also underpins the traditional justification for
judicial review; namely, that “the power of judicial review rests . . . upon the
constitutional duty of the judiciary ‘to say what the law is.’”174 As Chief Justice
Marshall wrote in Marbury v. Madison, “Those who apply the rule to
particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule. . . . So if a
law be in opposition to the constitution . . . the court must determine which of
these conflicting rules governs the case.”175 This, Marshall proclaimed, was “the
very essence of judicial duty.”176
Over time, however, the Supreme Court’s workload swelled beyond its
capacity. Between 1874 and 1924, the Court heard more than 200 or even
250 cases per year,177 and in the five years between 1917 and 1922, the Court
heard an average of 330 cases per term.178 In short, the size of the Court’s

170 THE ANTIFEDERALIST PAPERS No. 15, at 222, 223 (Brutus) (Morton Borden ed., 1965).
171 THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
172 See Tara Leigh Grove, The Structural Case for Vertical Maximalism, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 44–
56 (2009) [hereinafter Grove, Vertical Maximalism] (discussing the error correction role of the early
Supreme Court).
173 See Lerner & Lund, supra note 109, at 1277.
174 Fritz W. Scharpf, Judicial Review and the Political Question: A Functional Analysis, 75 YALE L.J.
517, 518 (1966) (emphasis in original) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177
(1803)); see generally ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (1962); Gary Lawson & Christopher D. Moore, The Executive
Power of Constitutional Interpretation, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1267, 1273 (1996) (“The power to interpret
the laws is an incident to this case- or controversy-deciding function; courts must interpret because
they must decide.”).
175 Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177–78.
176 Id. at 178.
177 Lerner & Lund, supra note 109, at 1268.
178 Hartnett, supra note 168, at 1646 n.12.
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docket eventually reached a point where full (or even mostly) mandatory
jurisdiction became practically untenable.179
Eventually, Congress stepped in to alleviate the issue, rendering most of
the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction discretionary in the so-called “Judges’ Bill”
of 1925, and eliminating almost all remaining mandatory jurisdiction in
1988.180 This allowed the Court to alter its “manner of speaking” over time to
“emphasize[] the enunciation of doctrine over the resolution of disputes,”181
definitively shifting the Supreme Court’s overall role in the constitutional
scheme from error-correction to law-declaration.182
Since this shift, the Supreme Court has steadily reduced the number of
cases it decides on the merits. Rather than deciding up to 350 cases per year,
the Supreme Court now typically decides “no more than 100 cases involving
about 70–75 opinions for the Court.”183 At the same time, Congress also eased
the relative workload of each case by doubling each Justice’s number of law
clerks from two (prior to 1970) to four (in 1978).184
Finally, the Justices “helped themselves” to more discretion soon after the
Judges’ Bill passed, “extend[ing] [their] discretion by (among other things)
claiming the power to issue limited writs of certiorari, by subjecting ostensibly
mandatory appeals to discretionary review, and by practically eliminating the
certification power of courts of appeals.”185

179 Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases Per Year: Some Implications of the Supreme Court’s
Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1096 (1987)
(stating that with the “expansion of federal judicial business . . . working for the general coherence of
the national legal system is the only possible function of the Court”).
180 Hartnett, supra note 168, at 1646 n.10.
181 Strauss, supra note 179, at 1094–95.
182 See generally Grove, Vertical Maximalism, supra note 172, at 44–59 (arguing that the Court better
maintains its hierarchical role by focusing more on setting precedent than in resolving disputes in an
individual case, as evidenced by a trend in the modern jurisprudence of the Court toward lawdeclaration).
183 Cramton, supra note 57, at 1317. See also Supreme Court Cases, October Term 2019-2020,
BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/Supreme_Court_cases,_October_term_20192020#:~:text=It%20is%20often%20referred%20to,during%20its%202019%2D2020%20term (last
visited Jan. 9, 2020) (noting that between 2007 and 2019, the Court has released an average of 76
cases per year). More recently, this number has moved into the 50s, but that may be related to Court’s
current remote posture due to the COVID-19 pandemic. See Steve Vladeck (@steve_vladeck),
TWITTER (Feb. 1, 2021, 4:00 PM), https://twitter.com/steve_vladeck/status/1356346603490185217
et seq.
184 Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note 58, at 808.
185 Hartnett, supra note 168, at 1704–05.
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All of these developments over the last century have empowered the
Court. Rather than resolving whatever cases come before it, the Court now has
the power to “set its own agenda” and can treat cases as mere “vehicles” for
taking up whatever social, political, or economic questions the Justices wish to
address.186 Contrary to Hamilton’s reassurances, “[this] ability to set one’s own
agenda is at the heart of exercising will.”187
The more we have taken this aspect of the Court’s role for granted, the
more law students, lawyers, judges, and politicians have shifted their
expectations about the role of the Justices themselves and the propriety of
assertive judicial intervention.188 And with increasing polarization among
political elites the Justices have now sorted into defined partisan blocs,189
encouraging ever-greater “celebrity” behavior.190
To counter these trends, the proposed package incrementally decreases
the discretion that a bare majority of the Justices hold over the decision to hear
cases with each successive policy layer.191 This approach would encourage the
Justices “to behave more like their counterparts on the inferior appellate
courts” and to shift their approach marginally closer back towards a more
limited “error-correction” role.192
186 Id. at 1718–19, 1733–34.
187 Id. at 1718.
188 Id. at 1733 (“[T]he Court’s unbridled discretion to control its own docket, choosing not only which
cases to decide, but also which ‘questions presented’ to decide, appears to have contributed to a
mindset that thinks of the Supreme Court more as sitting to resolve controversial questions than to
decide cases.”); id. at 1648 (stating that sweeping discretionary jurisdiction has “encouraged Supreme
Court Justices to think of themselves less as deciders of cases and more as final arbiters of
controversial questions” and “deeply shaped substantive constitutional law itself”). See also Grove,
Judicial Independence, supra note 1, at 472 (describing the process by which students, practitioners,
and judges are accultured to support certain conventions over time).
189 From 1790 until 1936, there were no “liberal and conservative blocs that fell along partisan lines as
defined by the party of the president who appointed a Justice.” DEVINS & BAUM, supra note 25, at
63. The “infrequency of dissent” may have been “partly a product of . . . the Court’s mandatory
jurisdiction over the great majority of cases that came before it during its first century of operation.”
Id. at 64.
190 Lerner & Lund, supra note 109, at 1259–60 (discussing the growing trend of “celebrity Justice”
behaviors: long, unnecessary opinions and emphasizing culture war issues and pop philosophy in
opinions over the resolution of cases).
191 A clarification: The Court current employs an informal “Rule of Four,” which gives some control to
a bare minority of Justices. Because a minority cannot prevent cases, however, the ideological
coalition in the majority holds the most agenda-setting power. See Joan Maisel Leiman, The Rule of
Four, 57 COLUM. L. REV. 975, 981 (1957) (stating that, according to Justice Van Devanter, the Court
always grants the certiorari petition when as many as four Justices think it should be granted).
192 Lerner & Lund, supra note 109, at 1273–74.
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i. Layer One: The Certiorari/Certification Rule
Professors Lerner’s and Lund’s proposal that the Supreme Court be
required to take more cases via certification by the courts of appeals than by
discretionary certiorari petitions would help decentralize the selection of the
cases on the Court’s docket.193
From a political perspective, this would help ensure that the Court’s docket
is largely driven “by the perceived needs of the judicial system, as determined
by the lower court judges themselves”194 and less driven by the ideological
agendas of the Justices. In this respect, it carries some benefits of Professors
Epps and Sitaraman’s more novel “lottery” approach without requiring a
wholesale overhaul over the Supreme Court’s structure.195 The concept of
“restoring” the Court’s jurisdiction is also likely to be less politically
controversial than the concept of “stripping” the Court’s jurisdiction—an
important factor in building political support for the overall reform package.
On the other hand, one might fairly wonder: Given the benefits of layering
for minimizing legal uncertainty, why not make jurisdiction-stripping “Layer
One” and jurisdiction-restoring “Layer Two”? That is an option, but
reformers should consider whether pairing such a reform with the
appointment-regularizing reforms above might encourage the Supreme Court
to strike down Layer One more readily than it might otherwise by giving the
Court an alternative basis for its decision.196 The reason for pairing an
appointment-regularizing policy with a jurisdiction-restoring policy is that only
the former turns on judicial behavior that is genuinely unpredictable.197
And that is because, from a legal perspective, the certification proposal
presents little risk. In fact, such a proposal is more consistent both with
Congress’s historical expectations about the Court’s appellate procedure and
with the constitutional role of the Court itself.
One early proposal for handling the Justices’ increased workload was to
create circuit courts and then require those circuits to certify any question

193
194
195
196

Id. at 1289.
Id.

Epps & Sitaraman, supra note 20, at 183–84.
Congress could, of course, separate the two policies so that the elements of Layer One do not rise
and fall together.
197 See Epps & Sitamaran, supra note 20, at 163 (arguing that public perception regarding how the
Supreme Court comes to decisions gives rise to its legitimacy and increases the potential for the
public to accept unpopular decisions).
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decided differently by another circuit court.198 Instead, Congress settled on a
design that would include both certification and certiorari, noting during the
hearings on the Judges’ Bill that the Supreme Court would not fully control its
own jurisdiction.199
The Court soon went about undermining the certification function,
however, by expressing hostility to certification and reading the role of
certification narrowly.200 As Professor Edward Hartnett observes, certificates
dropped off precipitously. From 1927 to 1936, the courts of appeals issued
seventy-two certificates. From 1937 to 1946, that dropped to twenty. And
between 1946 and 1985, the Court accepted four.201 “At this point, certification
is practically a dead letter,”202 contrary to the expectations of the Congress that
empowered the Court in the first place.
At a more fundamental level, discretionary jurisdiction itself is a legislative
creation—an exercise of Congress’s power to create exceptions to the Court’s
appellate jurisdiction.”203 This is a profoundly powerful point in favor of using
a jurisdiction-restoring approach. While the constitutionality of jurisdictionstripping becomes more dubious the more it disempowers the Court, the
constitutionality of jurisdiction-restoring arguably becomes stronger the more
it disempowers the Court.

ii. Layer Two: The Two-Thirds Certiorari Rule
Given the legal strength of the certiorari/certification rule, Layer One is
likely to stand or fall based on the Supreme Court’s views on the
constitutionality of the senior-status requirement. Assuming that the
“bifurcated court” approach outlined above is constitutional, the question then
becomes what jurisdiction-restoring approach is best suited to the new judicial
structure.

198
199
200
201
202
203

Hartnett, supra note 168, at 1651.
Id. at 1710.
Id. at 1710–12.

Id.
Id. at 1712.
See Grove, The Exceptions Clause, supra note 163, at 930–33, 952–59, 969–72. Some have
questioned the compatibility of discretionary review with the power of judicial review itself. See
Jennings & Acharya, supra note 4, at 413 (citing Charles L. Black, The Presidency and Congress, 32
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 841, 845–46 (1975)).

840

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 23:4

To ensure that the “full” Court does not use its agenda-control power to
pursue partisan ends or to otherwise manipulate the offerings available to the
most-junior nine Justices, Layer Two would implement a new rule to govern
petitions for certiorari.
Today, the Supreme Court follows an informal “Rule of Four.” If at least
four Justices support hearing a case, the Court will grant the petition for
certiorari.204 Layer Two would replace this rule with a formal, inverted
supermajority requirement: a petition would be granted unless two-thirds
voted to deny certiorari.205
Switching the default to grants while retaining a supermajority ability to
reject petitions would prevent a bare majority from exercising agenda control
and would move the institution as a whole marginally closer back towards the
error-correction role that it historically occupied by increasing the likelihood
of grants overall. To be sure, “even if the Court decided 150 or 200 cases per
year . . . , it would dispose of only a fraction of its 9,000-case docket and could
not possibly correct every error in lower court interpretations of federal law.”206
We are well past the day when the Court could feasibly exercise full mandatory
jurisdiction, and there are compelling normative reasons to reject this goal as
well.207
But the Court’s “error-correction” and “law-declaration” roles are less
distinct categories so much as ends on a spectrum. The certiorari votes of
individual Justices, for example, may reflect each Justice’s views about what
institutional place on this continuum the Supreme Court should occupy.208
Professors Margaret Meriwether Cordray and Richard Cordray suggest that
Justice White’s frequent certiorari votes tended to reflect his own view that

204 Leiman, supra note 191.
205 Jennings & Acharya, supra note 4, at 412, propose revising the Rule of Four and “requiring a
majority—or six, seven, eight, or even all nine—of the Justices to agree to grant certiorari” to “permit
minority perspectives on the Court to block cases that are likely to be the most ideologically, socially,
or politically divisive.” Although this helps neutralize action on the most divisive cases, it might (1)
leave splits standing and (2) further reduce the Justices’ workload, unintentionally encouraging
grandstanding and partisan celebrity behavior.
206 Grove, Vertical Maximalism, supra note 172, at 57.
207 See id. at 56–59 (“To fulfill its ‘supreme’ role in this judicial hierarchy, the Court must focus on
establishing broad precedents, not on correcting isolated errors in lower court decisions.”).
208 See Margaret Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray, The Philosophy of Certiorari: Jurisprudential
Considerations in Supreme Court Case Selection, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 389, 423 (2004) (proposing
that certiorari grant patterns reflect Justices’ views on whether the Court should utilize more of a
“rule-articulating approach,” a “standard-setting approach,” or “an incrementalist approach”).
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“[t]he function of a judge . . . is to decide cases, not to write essays or to
expound theories,”209 while Justice Scalia’s less frequent votes reflected his view
that the Supreme Court should take a more assertive, rule-articulation
approach.210
By imposing a new certiorari rule that automatically grants petitions unless
a supermajority of the Justices denies the petition, Congress could weigh in on
this debate and implement its own view that the Court should be more in the
business of deciding cases and less in the business of setting rules—a
systematically, if subtly, disempowering shift.

iii. Layer Three: The Unanimous Certiorari Rule
If the Justices invalidate both Layer One and Layer Two, the Supreme
Court will grow well beyond its current size given the terms of Layer Three.
With this expanded membership, the Supreme Court could handle a far
greater workload, allowing it to move even closer to the error-correction end
of the spectrum.
For this reason, Layer Three would implement a unanimous certiorari
rule, placing a heavy thumb on the scale in favor of the Court granting petitions
and resolving cases.211 Shifting to a rule that requires unanimity might also have
additional benefits.
First, an unanimity rule would end any attempt by the Justices to exercise
the Court’s agenda-setting power in even minimally partisan ways given the
dispersal of control.
Second, it would create strong intra-institutional levers of power to
encourage consensus both inside and outside the certiorari process itself. By
granting individual Justices the power to marginally increase their colleagues’
workload, Congress could introduce a form of “judicial filibuster” into the
Court’s internal deliberations. This procedural leverage could have a
meaningful substantive impact, not only encouraging consensus around
holdings, but even encouraging consensus around judicial culture and
language. Individual Justices may be less likely to write a sarcastic takedown in
209 Id. at 429.
210 Id. at 425–27.
211 One might ask why not simply restore mandatory jurisdiction. First, even a greatly expanded Court
likely could not resolve all the petitions that the Court receives in any given year. Second, giving the
Court a “percolation” option may be useful to help develop the law and allow for a degree of flexibility
that is useful in promoting constitutional stability. Id. at 437–39.
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a concurring opinion or publicly wade into culture wars off the bench if they
know their peers will punish such behavior with more work.212
Third, by reducing the rewards of “celebrity” behavior and the power and
prestige of the Court overall, these changes might rein in a related problem:
circuit judges “auditioning” for a position on the Supreme Court.213
In the end, Layer Three offers an approach that redefines both the size
and function of the Supreme Court in a surprisingly disempowering way, given
the proposal’s clear constitutional footing.

C. Layering Objections
With so many political and legal benefits associated with layered reform,
why pursue any other approach? Unfortunately, there will always be some
legal unpredictability surrounding any proposal, and the very process of
layering policies introduces its own kind of uncertainty into the transition.
While the constitutionality of fallback law in general seems secure enough
to outweigh the uncertainties associated with various standalone plans, some
potential legal objections remain, and there are more (and less) risky
approaches to layering. I address these below.
In the end, the only true insurance against the “tail risk” of complete
invalidation is the combination of political safeguards discussed in Part II.B.:
mandatory appeal, consolidated venue, and prioritization. By including these
provisions in any reform package, Congress can protect its prerogative to
respond to whatever action the Supreme Court takes.

1. Legislative Duty
In his article, Fallback Law, Professor Dorf suggests that contingent
legislative design raises difficult theoretical questions about the legislator’s duty
to exercise independent constitutional judgment, whether one subscribes to a
Lincolnian view, a Dialectic view, or even a Judicial Exclusivity view.214 The
conceptual tensions that Professor Dorf identifies are intriguing, and I
commend readers to his excellent analysis.
212 See CARLY SIMON, You’re So Vain, on NO SECRETS (Elektra 1972) (“You’re so vain/You probably
think this song is about you.”).
213 See Lerner & Lund, supra note 109, at 1294 (arguing that changes “might even encourage some
mediocre lower court judges to refrain from campaigning for a seat on the high court”).
214 Dorf, supra note 81, at 342–50.
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For our more pedestrian purposes, however, Professor Dorf’s final
takeaway puts to rest any concerns that legislators might have: the Supreme
Court almost certainly will not invalidate legislation on this basis.215 To do so,
the Court would need to strike down otherwise valid legislation based on a
brand-new separation of powers doctrine built on an equally new
constitutional theory. What theory? That the Supreme Court has the power
to judicially enforce a legislative duty that itself requires legislators to “abide by
their best guess about what the courts would do.”216
As Professor Dorf concludes, “[m]erely to describe such possibilities is to
explain why they are untenable as formal doctrines.”217 Even judicial
supremacy does not require this kind of legislative groveling.

2. Nondelegation
With the nondelegation doctrine on the cusp of making a comeback,218
might the Court hold that a layered design impermissibly delegates policy
choices to the judiciary?219
No. In a layered design, the Court is not being asked to craft policy or even
to choose in its own discretion among various policy options. Rather, the
Court must enforce a clear legislative policy: Layer One. If the Court holds
that legislative policy is constitutionally deficient, it must enforce a different,
clear legislative policy: Layer Two.

215
216
217
218

Id. at 350–51.
Id.
Id. at 351.
See Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2130–31 (2019) (Alito, J., concurring) (“[S]ince 1935,

the Court has uniformly rejected nondelegation arguments . . . . If a majority of this Court were willing
to reconsider the approach we have taken for the past 84 years, I would support that effort.”); id. at
2131–2148 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (arguing that the provision of the Sex Offender Registration and
Notification Act (“SORNA”) authorizing the Attorney General to specify registration requirements
violates the nondelegation doctrine); see also Hannah Mullen & Sejal Singh, The Supreme Court
Wants to Revive a Doctrine That Would Paralyze Biden’s Administration , SLATE (Dec. 1, 2020,
12:56
PM),
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2020/12/supreme-court-gundy-doctrineadministrative-state.html (explaining there are at least five justices who have indicated they would
support a “revived nondelegation doctrine”).
219 See Dorf, supra note 81, at 326 (arguing that Congress does not violate the nondelegation doctrine
when it enacts fallback laws).
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Ironically, Congress delegates more implicit authority to the Judiciary
when it declines to include severability guidance or other substitute law, as
Bowsher v. Synar suggests.220

3. Judicial Coercion
The strongest objection to contingent design is that it could be used to
coerce the Judiciary in a way that undercuts decisional independence.221
Consider a plainly unconstitutional law backed up by an unrelated fallback
provision that dramatically raises taxes or terminates a popular program.222 As
Dorf notes, “[b]y including a highly undesirable fallback provision in
legislation, the legislature can raise the cost of invalidation to the court.”223
This kind of judicial coercion seems contrary to basic principles of
decisional independence central to the exercise of judicial power. And the
principle that coerced acts are void or illegitimate “is about as basic as legal
principles get.”224 Even if Congress has the power to enact freestanding
legislation that “retaliates” against a judicial decision ex post,225 it might lack the
power to “pretaliate” as a way to force the Court’s hand ex ante.226

220 See supra text accompanying notes 82–87; see also Dorf, supra note 81, at 327 (“Seen in this light,
we can understand substitutive fallback law as a legislative effort to avoid the delegation issues that
arise from a general background presumption of severability.”).
221 See generally Dorf, supra note 81, at 327–42 (discussing how the legislature can create laws to coerce
the judiciary); Kameny, supra note 91, at 1001 (arguing that the legislature sometimes uses
inseverability clauses for “an in terrorem function, as the legislature attempts to guard against judicial
review altogether by making the price of invalidation too great.”).
222 Or consider the DOMA hypothetical posed in Dorf, supra note 81, at 333–36.
223 Id. at 327.
224 Kameny, supra note 91, at 1001–02 (“[F]or example, a contract entered into under duress is void; a
will or other donative transfer executed under duress is void; an involuntary confession by a criminal
defendant is inadmissible; and so on.”).
225 Dorf, supra note 81, at 332 (“There are also reasons of principle to think that perhaps Congress is
entitled to retaliate against the courts for unpopular decisions. Although the Court’s modern
jurisprudence tends to be self-protective, Stuart v. Laird and Ex parte McCardle have not been
formally overruled . . . .” (footnotes omitted)).
226 Id. at 335–36. Some argue that United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. 128 (1871), and its progeny support
Congress’s power to coerce the judiciary in this way. See, e.g., Keshav Poddar, How Democrats Can
Keep Their Policies Safe From This Supreme Court, SLATE (Jan. 26, 2021, 5:45 AM),
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2021/01/democrats-supreme-court-progressive-policiesprotection.html (“Congress could . . . use[e] backup provisions unrelated to the main policy in a bill
to coerce the [C]ourt into letting the legislation stand [because] . . . the [C]ourt has held that Congress
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Assuming that a majority of the Justices are open to announcing a new
separation of powers doctrine to this effect, the court reform package above
could raise two questions. What would be the “test” for unconstitutional
coercion, and would the particular layering found in the proposal above violate
that test?
National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius (NFIB) offers at
least one data point for thinking through how the Court might operationalize

can change underlying law relevant to a specific case . . . to explicitly dictate what the outcome of that
case should be.”). This is questionable.
By most accounts, Klein prohibits Congress from conditioning the Court’s jurisdiction on a particular
outcome on the merits, thereby ensuring that only one party can win on the merits. See Ryan, supra
note 108, at 793 (explaining that the Court in Klein forbids Congress from granting jurisdiction
conditionally to force the Court to reach a certain outcome); see also Patchak v. Zinke, 138 S. Ct.
897, 905 (2018) (plurality opinion) (“Congress violates Article III when it compel[s] . . . findings or
results under old law, [in effect dictating that] [i]n Smith v. Jones, Smith wins.” (first two alterations
in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted)). If, however, Congress changes the
law relevant to a specific pending case (including jurisdictional law), it can effectively achieve a similar
result. See generally Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310 (2016), and Patchak, 138 S. Ct. at
897. But this power does not neatly track the constitutional issues raised by backup law as a
conceptual matter, nor are the boundaries of this power settled as a practical matter.
On the conceptual front, coercive backup laws and changes to the law underlying a pending case both
reflect congressional attempts to achieve a particular result, but they use distinct methods and raise
different concerns. For Klein, Congress wants a particular judgment in a pending case (or set of cases)
and so Congress writes a law that unambiguously forces the desired result based on the expectation
that the Court will faithfully interpret and apply the new law. For pretaliation, Congress wants a
particular interpretation of the Constitution (across all cases, pending and future) and so Congress
writes the backup law in a way expected to compromise the Court’s faithful interpretation of the
primary law. One strikes at judicial independence over the decisional process, while the other strikes
at judicial independence over the interpretive process. See G. Michael Parsons, Gerrymandering &
Justiciability: The Political Question Doctrine After Rucho v. Common Cause, 95 IND. L.J. 1295,
1323–45 (2020). To be sure, a principled basis exists for viewing the latter as more contestable terrain.
See supra note 38. But the current Supreme Court seems likely to view both with a skeptical eye, and
many scholars have proposed that the Court adopt a purpose-based reading of Klein that is more
aggressive, not less. See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 64, at 1074–83 (discussing the importance of
considering Congress’s intent when interpreting statutes and arguing that the Court did this in Klein);
Shugerman, supra note 51, at 985 (suggesting that Klein is about Congress’s motive).
On the practical front, the most recent case in the Klein line—Patchak v. Zinke—was a highly fractured
case with no majority opinion. Only four Justices—Thomas, Breyer, Alito, and Kagan—stated
Congress could remove jurisdiction over a pending case to ensure that case would be dismissed.
Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor thought the suit should be dismissed on sovereign-immunity
grounds, and Justices Kennedy and Gorsuch joined a dissent by Chief Justice Roberts who would
have held the law to be an unlawful intrusion upon the judicial power. This does not bode well for
any future attempts by Congress to explore the boundaries of decisional- or interpretive-forcing,
especially with the addition of Justices Kavanaugh and Barrett. [Disclosure: I represented
Respondent Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians in Patchak v. Zinke.]
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a “decisional-coercion” standard.227 In NFIB, the Supreme Court struck down
part of the Affordable Care Act’s Medicaid expansion provision.228 The
provision required states to expand Medicaid coverage to cover all individuals
under the age of 65 with incomes below 133 percent of the federal poverty
line.229 If a state did not do so, it would lose all of its federal Medicaid funding,
including the funding it received before the enactment of the Affordable Care
Act.230
The NFIB Court held that this exceeded Congress’s powers under the
Spending Clause of Article I, Section 8.231 Although Congress may “grant
federal funds to the States, and may condition such a grant upon the States’
‘taking certain actions that Congress could not require them to take,’”232 the
terms of that condition cannot cross the constitutional line from
encouragement to coercion.233 Seven of the Justices held that the Medicaid
expansion conditions crossed the line into unconstitutional coercion, but the
rationales offered for this holding split across two opinions.234
For our purposes, a deep dive into the specifics of each opinion is
unnecessary. The composition of the Court has changed in significant ways
since the decision, and the substantial differences between spending-coercion
and judicial-coercion strains the analogical value of any detailed analysis. (One
can question, for example, the premise that Congress possesses a predicate
power to intentionally “encourage” a particular judicial decision, let alone
“coerce” it.)
For the sake of prediction, however, NFIB reflects the Court’s general
willingness to articulate doctrines that protect the perceived prerogatives of

227

See Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 575–85 (2012) (Roberts, C.J.) (applying a

coercion standard to the Affordable Care Act).
228 See id. at 585 (severing part of the statute because “the Secretary cannot apply § 1396c to withdraw
existing Medicaid funds for failure to comply with the requirements set out in the expansion”).
229 Id. at 576 (Roberts, C.J.) (“The Medicaid provisions of the Affordable Care Act, in contrast, require
States to expand their Medicaid programs by 2014 to cover all individuals under the age of 65 with
incomes below 133 percent of the federal poverty line.”).
230 Id. at 579–80 (“Instead of simply refusing to grant the new funds to States that will not accept the new
conditions, Congress has also threatened to withhold those States’ existing Medicaid funds.”).
231 Id. at 579–80; id. at 681–82 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting).
232 Id. at 576 (Roberts, C.J.) (quoting Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd.,
527 U.S. 666, 686 (1999)).
233 Id. at 579–80; id. at 681–82 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting).
234 See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Anti-Leveraging Principle and the Spending Clause After NFIB, 101
GEO. L.J. 861, 866–67 (2013) (outlining the opinions in NFIB).
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constitutional actors, and the decision also reveals several factors that could
play into an anti-coercion standard: germaneness of the condition,235
significance of impact,236 existence of coercion-in-fact,237 attaching new
conditions to an existing status quo,238 or perhaps some combination of these
factors (e.g., “leveraging”).239
By almost all of these measures, the proposal above would seem to fare
well. Each of its two policies—regularizing appointments and restoring
jurisdiction—have common institutional aims addressing related troubling
trends, and each layer pursues those ends with increasingly “settled” policy
choices. No layer operates as a “punishment” unrelated to the prior layer, no
layer attaches new conditions to an existing status quo, and no layer imposes
any kind of drastic short-term change.240
To be sure, the use of a contingent design (whatever the particular
substance of its layers) is intended to level the institutional advantage of inertia
that the Court might otherwise use to fight off reform, but that is not relevant
to the question presented here: whether any of the specific backup policies
proposed above might coerce the Court into choosing the primary policy in a
way that threatens the Court’s decisional independence over the
constitutionality of the primary policy.
The only aspect of the package remotely open to a coercion objection
could be the fact that the two policies are tied together within each layer: each
layer stands or falls as one. Why would this create concern? Because Justices
in the majority could view the “threat” to their agenda-setting power (reflected

235 See id. at 892 (noting that Roberts “employed an analysis that resembles, but is importantly distinct
from, the germaneness doctrine”).
236 See id. at 871 (noting that the dissenters “looked principally to the size of the federal grant at issue”).
237 See id. at 870 (“For the Chief Justice, then, congressional motive to pressure the states is not enough
to render a threatened funding cutoff unconstitutional; rather, the threat must actually take away the
states’ ability, ‘not merely in theory but in fact,’ to choose whether to accept a funding condition.”
(quoting NFIB, 567 U.S. at 581)).
238 See id at 872 (“And that is true whether the conditions are new strings attached to a preexisting federal
program or are terms imposed for the first time in an entirely new program.”).
239 See id.
240 Consider a senior-status requirement backed by a provision that immediately changes the size of the
Court to twenty-five members so that the current President can appoint all of the new members at
once. The question is not whether such a plan is independently constitutional, but whether using
such a plan as a backup provision to the senior-status requirement plan could be seen as coercing the
Justices into ruling favorably on the senior-status requirement.
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in layers two and three) as a way of influencing their decision on the merits of
the senior-status policy found in layer one.
The idea that this aspect of the legislation could be held “threatening” in a
way that renders the entire bill constitutionally invalid seems implausible for
many reasons.
First, each layer’s approach to restoring jurisdiction is reasonably related
to that layer’s approach to regularizing appointments. If the Supreme Court
will remain at nine active Justices (as under Layer One), making only minor
changes to the structure of the Court’s docket seems appropriate. If the
Supreme Court seems likely to swell to, say, twenty or more Justices (as under
Layer Three), shifting more heavily towards an error-correction role becomes
more feasible. And the bigger the active appellate bench the more errorcorrecting it can be, which explains the differences between Layer Two and
Layer Three.
Second, all the layers reduce the Court’s overall agenda-setting power to
some extent. Thus, Layer One does not offer any kind of inappropriate
“inducement” since none of the layers maintain the status quo.
Third, it is worth considering who the change supposedly threatens, what
power is supposedly threatened, and how that relates to the judicial role. The
imposition of a supermajority (or unanimity) requirement to govern the power
of case selection only reins in the power of particular blocs of Justices to decide
what cases the Court should decide. Not only is this discretionary power a
matter of legislative grace, but it also already stands in tension with the Justices’
own constitutional duties and is exercised in ways contrary to the implicit
assurances provided to Congress when the power was granted.
In advocating for the power to exercise this discretion, the Justices assured
Congress that any petitions involving cases “of public importance or of wide
general interest”—especially constitutional cases—would be granted in due
course, and that the denial of petitions would mainly impact the “very large
proportion of the cases that come to the court” and “ought never to be there
at all.”241
The Supreme Court as an institution is supposed to exercise its certiorari
power in a nonpartisan and nonideological manner—or at least, to quote the
Massachusetts Constitution, in a manner as impartial “as the lot of humanity

241 Hartnett, supra note 168, at 1680, 1685 (citations omitted).

August 2021]

CONTINGENT COURT REFORM

849

will admit.”242 Such a power simply is not threatened by a supermajority or
unanimity requirement. No bloc of Justices within the Court is supposed to be
exercising any kind of ideological agenda-setting power in the first place, so
any suggestion that the “power” of such a bloc of Justices would be threatened
amounts to a confession of bad faith by the Court more than a demonstration
of bad faith by Congress.
In short, the “tying” within each layer cannot act as a sword of Damocles
without revealing the depth of the rot that the policies themselves are designed
to address. Both liberal and conservative Justices alike pledge fidelity (to an
almost comical degree) to the idea that they are mere “umpires”243 in the
constitutional scheme, calling “balls and strikes”244 by impartially “applying the
law to the facts at hand.”245
While few legal scholars subscribe to such a simplistic assessment of
judicial power (and one might reasonably question the sincerity of such
statements), the universal invocation of these themes during confirmation
hearings “suggests the existence of deep popular expectations about the
distinction between law and politics.”246 And if Justices do not view themselves
as “policy entrepreneurs, who seek to fulfill their policy goals through . . . their
case selection policies”247 there is no basis for believing that a rule requiring
unanimity to deny certiorari could be a “threat.”

242 MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. XXIX.
243 Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice of the United
States: Hearing Before the Comm. on the Judiciary U.S. S., 109th Cong. 55 (2005) (statement of
John G. Roberts, Nominee to be C.J. of the United States); Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination

of Hon. Sonia Sotomayor, to Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States:
Hearing Before the Comm. on the Judiciary U.S. S., 111th Cong. 79 (2009) (statement of Hon. Sonia
Sotomayor, Nominated to be an Associate J. of the Supreme Court of the United States); see also
Brett M. Kavanaugh, I Am an Independent, Impartial Judge, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 4, 2018, 7:30 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/i-am-an-independent-impartial-judge-1538695822 (“[A] good judge
must be an umpire—a neutral and impartial arbiter who favors no political party, litigant or policy.”).
244 Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice of the United
States, supra note 243, at 56.
245 Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Hon. Sonia Sotomayor, to Be an Associate Justice of
the Supreme Court of the United States, supra note 243, at 79; see also The Nomination of Elena

Kagan to Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the
Comm. on the Judiciary U.S. S., 111th Cong. 202–03 (statement of Elena Kagan, Solicitor General
of the United States) (emphasizing that judges do not do “anything other than apply[] the law.”).
246 Lerner & Lund, supra note 109, at 1256.
247 Hartnett, supra note 168, at 1720 (citation omitted).
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For these reasons, it seems unlikely that the Justices would hold that the
layered design above unconstitutionally undermines their interpretive
independence.
All the same, enacting meaningful court reform is already an unpredictable
endeavor and legislators may wish to minimize risk to the greatest extent
possible. By uncoupling the two policies so that each stands alone, Congress
could preempt even the minimal risk that the Court could hold the “tied”
approach to layering coercive.
CONCLUSION
As I began writing the conclusion to this Article, an armed mob incited by
President Trump broke into the U.S. Capitol, inflicting violence and
destruction in an attempt to halt the counting of electoral college votes and the
peaceful transition of power.248 As Members of Congress took shelter under
their chairs, Capitol Police deployed tear gas in the rotunda and drew weapons
at the chamber doors to protect the elected officials inside.249 During the
insurrection that left five dead, authorities also discovered explosive devices
hidden outside the nearby headquarters of the two major parties.250
We are, hopefully, beyond the stage of denial where the implosion of
democratic conventions can be written off as liberal handwringing. Norms at
the federal (and state)251 level have been collapsing at an astonishing rate, and
it is time to stop indulging the notion that this growing authoritarian strain in
our politics will dissipate with accommodation.

248 See Lisa Mascaro, Eric Tucker, Mary Clare Jalonick & Andrew Taylor, Biden Win Confirmed After
Pro-Trump Mob Storms US Capitol, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Jan. 7, 2021),
https://apnews.com/article/joe-biden-confirmed-0409d7d753461377ff2c5bb91ac4050c.
249 Id.
250 See generally Rosa Sanchez, FBI Posts Photo of Person Who Placed Suspected Pipe Bombs Outside
DNC, RNC, ABC NEWS (Jan. 11, 2021, 7:31 PM), https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/fbi-posts-photoperson-suspected-pipe-bombs-dnc/story?id=75126041.
251 See, e.g., Miriam Seifter, Judging Power Plays in the American States, 97 TEX. L. REV. 1217, 1224
(2019) (noting the rise of so-called “power plays” that “bear a close family resemblance to the more
familiar concept of what legal scholars have termed ‘constitutional hardball’: practices that flout widely
agreed upon constitutional understandings without violating the law outright”); Levy, supra note 143,
at 1122 (“[Court packing] has unquestionably happened in the past several years in state courts across
the country. Specifically, in the last decade, there have been legislative attempts in at least ten states
to alter the size of their courts of last resort, with two being ‘successful.’”).
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In 2021, Democrats have a chance to rebuff (and, Republicans, a chance
to repent for) the unpacking scheme that unsettled longstanding traditions
governing Supreme Court appointments and to rebuild in their place a fairer
and more durable system. Those committed to reestablishing and respecting
democratic principles should put their words into action.
A commitment to reforming the Supreme Court is only one part in that
process, but no less important for it.252 As Professor Michael Seidman’s
contribution to this Symposium on “Constitutional Law Outside the Courts”
makes plain, the line between law and politics is often illusory,253 and the
exercise of power by the Supreme Court cannot be independent or legitimate
if it is unrepublican.
And while Democrats should make a good-faith effort to create bipartisan
buy-in from Republicans, the “proactive” insights above suggest that
Democrats should not simply stand by and wait for the Biden Administration’s
bipartisan court-reform commission to announce its findings.
To start, the window of time available in a legislative session is a source of
institutional power that Congress should not squander. Moreover, the task of
identifying a “best” proposal is a trap. The only consensus that matters is the
kind forged in actual legislative negotiations, and the presentation of a single
proposal (rather than a layered proposal) could have the perverse effect of
shrinking the space for potential agreement. Both Congress and the
commission should be careful to avoid investing too much time and attention
in a process that could ultimately undermine political action rather than
encouraging it.
Whatever system emerges, Congress could and should also apply it to the
entire federal judiciary. The patterns and habits of strategic judicial retirements
and partisan unpacking-through-obstruction extend well beyond the Supreme

252 Indeed, the opportunity to make inroads in the Judiciary was a meaningful source of the Republican
establishment’s indulgence of the party’s Trumpian turn. See Elie Mystal, Donald Trump and the
Plot
to
Take
Over
the
Courts,
NATION
(July
15,
2019),
https://www.thenation.com/article/society/trump-mcconnel-court-judges-plot/ (“Trump has been all
too happy to play along with the game orchestrated by Senate majority leader Mitch McConnell
[because] Trump delivers the judges, helping fulfill the conservative movement’s long-cherished
dream of remaking the judiciary, and his base remains content.”).
253 See Louis Michael Seidman, Rucho is Right – But for the Wrong Reasons, 23 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
(forthcoming
2021)
(manuscript
at
5–9),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3715561 (arguing that it is “close to inevitable
that political considerations will play some role in the [legislative districting] process”).
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Court, and, in the latter case, the more routine stalling of lower-court judge
confirmations arguably prepared the ground for the blockade of Judge
Garland.254 An eighteen-year senior service requirement could extend to all
judicial offices to prevent judicial manipulation, and new seats could be
created automatically based on a predictable schedule and a formula tied to
caseload per court to prevent legislative manipulation.255
Any statutory change is, of course, subject to the risk that the opposing
party will roll it back after the next election or whenever the opportunity arises.
Nothing about the package above can guarantee bipartisan compliance over
time.
But then there’s nothing magical about the number nine either. Norms are
durable only when they are shared. The layered approach—and plan—above
proposes just one method to quickly assemble the largest possible coalition
around a set of principled practices. Beyond that, it’s up to us to make
deviations from the plan a new “third rail” of politics and to transform those
practices into stable conventions.

254 See, e.g., Sam Berger, Conservative Court Packing, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Apr. 3, 2019, 9:01
AM), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/democracy/news/2019/04/03/468234/conservativecourt-packing/ (“[T]he treatment of Judge Garland was merely the most visible manifestation of a farreaching scheme to hold judicial seats open until a conservative president could fill them. It was
conservative efforts to prevent any appointments to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit—following five years of obstructing Obama’s judicial nominees—that finally led
senators supportive of President Barack Obama’s nominees to eliminate the filibuster in 2013 when
confirming lower-court judges.”).
255 See Jamelle Bouie, Court Packing Can Be an Instrument of Justice, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 9, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/09/opinion/court-packing-amy-coney-barrett.html (noting that the
last major expansion was thirty years ago, the population has grown since then, and the Judicial
Conference of the United States itself uses a formula for recommending the creation of new seats).

